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Abstract: In this paper, we explore the effects of dialectal diversity on economic performance by 
drawing evidence from Chinese prefecture-level cities. Our dataset is a panel of 5-year average data 
over the period from 2001 to 2015 including 274 cities. We compute five indices of Chinese dialectal 
diversity: 1. Dialectal fractionalization; 2. Adjusted dialectal fractionalization; 3. Dialectal polarization; 
4. Adjusted dialectal polarization and 5. Periphery heterogeneity. We find that dialectal 
fractionalization and dialectal polarization as well as periphery heterogeneity have a positive effect 
on both income per capita and economic growth. Adjusted dialectal fractionalization exhibits a 
positive effect only on the change in economic growth over time. However, adjusted dialectal 
polarization does not show any robust effects. Furthermore, the experience of being governed by the 
Chinese Communist Party during the revolutionary war inhibits the negative effects of dialectal 
diversity in eastern China, while it has persistent negative effects in central and north-eastern regions 
of the country.  
 
Key words: dialectal diversity, local economic performance, communist governance 
 
JEL: O10, O40, P51, Z19 
 
I. Introduction 
In this paper, the relationship between Chinese dialectal diversity and economic performance is 
explored empirically at the level of Chinese prefecture-level cities4. Currently, China has ten major 
dialectal supergroups, including about 100 dialectal subgroups (see the list of dialects in Appendix 
A). Since the division of administrative areas is not based on dialects and there have historically been 
several waves of migration, it is common that citizens of one prefecture-level city belong to different 
dialect groups, which makes it possible to explore the effect of dialectal diversity on economic 
performance. Thus, in this study, dialectal diversity is taken as the index of cultural diversity. In 
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economic studies, cultural diversity may hinder economic development by inducing communication 
difficulties, more social conflicts, distorted policies and inefficiency in governance. However, cultural 
diversity may benefit the economy by increasing innovation and market specialization. Given its long 
history of diversity, Chinese society is very inclusive of people from different dialect groups and there 
are few obstacles to their communication, which may undermine the negative effect of cultural 
diversity on economic development. Furthermore, the writing system is common for all dialects and 
the official language, Putonghua, has been promoted since the 1950s, providing more pathways for 
different dialect groups to understand each other.5 Hence, at the local level in China, the negative 
effect of dialectal diversity is reduced, and we expect a positive influence on economic growth.   
However, studies have found negative effects of both ethnic diversity at the provincial level 
(Dincer and Wang, 2011) and dialect diversity at the prefectural level (Xu et al., 2015) in China. But 
the discussion can be improved. Firstly, cultural diversity is not well measured. On the one hand, 
ethnic diversity is not a good index of cultural diversity in China. Since many ethnicities have been 
assimilated by the Han culture, they use Han dialects as their only language or the main language. 
Thus, ethnic diversity only captures a small part of cultural diversity. On the other hand, the number 
of Han dialects used in each city (Xu et al., 2015) can reflect neither the fractionalization nor the 
polarization of the population. If one dialect is used only by a small fraction of the population, the 
equal treatment of all dialects will result in biased results. Although dialectal fractionalization is used 
in the robustness test by Xu et al. (2015), dialectal distances are not examined in their paper. Secondly, 
in the research by Xu et al. (2015), only data of the year 2010 is used. This cannot capture the actual 
effects of dialectal diversity because of unobserved factors. Thirdly, in the analysis of endogeneity of 
dialectal diversity, Xu et al. (2015) use the railway index in the period of the Republic of China as the 
instrumental variable because the railway index can be explained as an indicator of land quality. 
However, the index may affect economic development in other channels, such as trade and freight 
traffic. 
In this paper, we perform an improved empirical analysis of the relationship between dialectal 
diversity and economic development. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we argue that linguistic 
 
5  It is true that some people do not master the writing or Putonghua. They may also have difficulty in 
understanding other dialects or being understood themselves. But these are mainly old people and they account 
for a very small part of the population in prefecture-level cities. Their economic activities are primarily in local 
neighbourhoods and they encounter few communication difficulties. 
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fractionalization has a positive association with growth and development. We also make three main 
contributions to the research on dialectal diversity in China. First, five indices of Chinese dialectal 
diversity are calculated to measure dialectal diversity of prefecture-level cities: dialectal 
fractionalization, adjusted dialectal fractionalization, dialectal polarization, adjusted dialectal 
polarization and peripheral heterogeneity. Dialectal fractionalization represents the probability that 
two randomly selected persons are from two different dialect groups and it increases with the number 
of groups and the balance of population distribution. Dialectal polarization is used as the index 
reflecting the tension between the two largest groups. The polarization index mainly depicts how 
much the population distribution across groups deviates from a bimodal distribution and reaches its 
maximum when there are only two groups of equal size. Adjusted dialectal fractionalization and 
polarization refer to indices adjusted by dialectal distances, but the adjusted dialectal polarization 
puts a larger weight on the dialectal distances between the two largest groups. Periphery 
heterogeneity considers the interaction between the largest group and other groups and the dialectal 
distance between them. By comparing the effect of these, we can find whether dialectal distances have 
a role in explaining differences in economic development and the distance between which groups is 
more relevant.  
Second, a panel sample covering the period 2001-2015 is constructed and 5-year average is used 
in the estimation. Therefore, we have the second contribution that a fixed-effect model is used and 
the effect of unobserved factors is reduced. Third, the difference in the effect resulting from exposure 
to the governance of the Chinese Communist Party during the revolutionary war and resources for 
economic development is determined. Prefecture-level cities with a longer exposure to the 
governance of the Chinese Communist Party are more deeply affected by the communist value 
system. Therefore, citizens’ values and beliefs are affected by the difference in treatment by 
communism. On the other hand, the long exposure to the Party’s governance leaves a higher 
proportion of cadres from the native population in local government and this leads to different 
outcomes in dealing with the interest conflicts between different groups. Furthermore, we consider 
the effect on the efficiency of governance at the local level of the economic environment given 
resources and support from the central government to develop the economy.  
We find that in China dialectal diversity is conducive to higher levels of growth and 
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development. 6  Analysis of the whole sample indicates that dialectal fractionalization and 
polarization as well as periphery heterogeneity have a positive impact on economic growth. Dialectal 
fractionalization adjusted by dialectal distances shows a positive effect only on the change in 
economic growth over time. But dialectal polarization adjusted by dialectal distances does not show 
any robust effect. Thus, dialectal distance between two polarized groups is not relevant for economic 
performance. Furthermore, exposure to the governance of the Chinese Communist Party during the 
revolutionary war causes a difference in the effect of dialectal diversity. In eastern China, communist 
experience tends to inhibit the negative impact of dialectal diversity while inducing negative 
influences in central and north-eastern part of China.  
The organization of the paper is the following. The second section covers the literature review of 
the effect of cultural diversity on economic development and the experience of communism. In the 
third section, we discuss the relationship between dialectal and cultural diversity. The fourth section 
reports the data description and empirical strategy. A baseline fixed-effect regression and IV 
(instrumental variable) analysis are in the fifth section. The sixth section analyzes the differential 
effects from the longer exposure to the governance of Chinese Communist Party. The seventh section 
concludes.  
 
II. Literature  
Cultural diversity & economic development 
As early as in 1967, the effects of cultural diversity on economic development attracted attention. 
Adelman and Morris (1967) conclude that economic growth rates tend to be higher in less 
heterogeneous countries, based on the data of 72 less developed countries from 1957 to 1962 and their 
linguistic diversity. Through re-analysis of data on 114 world polities from A Cross Polity Survey, 
Haug (1967) also finds that high cultural diversity is related to lower per capita GNP. The first 
economic study using modern econometric methods is by Easterly and Levine (1997), who adopt 
three measures of ethnic diversity. The results of a cross-country analysis indicate that high ethnic 
diversity induces low schooling, political instability, underdeveloped financial systems, distorted 
foreign exchange markets, high government deficits, insufficient infrastructure, low income and low 
 
6 See also Table B50 of Desmet et al. (2017) on the effects of diversity on log per capita income to corroborate 
our argument.  
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growth rates. The direct effects of ethnic diversity can also explain significant differences in economic 
growth across African countries and the Asian miracle. Thus, this paper initiates the study of both 
transmission channels and the direct effects of cultural diversity on economic development. The 
channel of government consumption is analyzed by La Porta et al. (1999). Cultural diversity tends to 
increase government consumption, but its effect depends on the utilization of the consumption. More 
recently, Alesina and La Ferrara (2004) find direct negative effects of both ethnic and linguistic 
diversity on economic growth, but the negative effect is mitigated by a higher initial income level. 
Goeren (2014) examines the direct and indirect effects of both ethnic fractionalization and polarization 
on economic growth through eight transmission channels: investment, civil war, human capital, 
government consumption, political instability, market distortion, trade openness and fertility. The 
dataset used is the updated version of the Barro–Lee data set on educational attainment and consists 
of 100 countries with 651 observations over the period 1960–1999. It does not only confirm that ethnic 
diversity has a strong direct negative effect on economic growth, but also establishes the indirect 
negative effect of ethnic polarization. Garcia-Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a) also analyze the 
indirect effects of ethnic fractionalization and polarization through the channels of investment, 
government consumption and civil war. Taking child mortality, fertility, education and wealth as the 
outcomes of human development, Gerring et al. (2015) find that the negative effects of cultural 
diversity exist at national levels, while not at subnational levels. 
However, Lian and Oneal (1997) argue that cultural diversity does not have significant effects on 
either economic growth or political instability. The reason for the difference may be that political 
institutions are not controlled in the research above. Collier (2000) develops a theoretical model with 
respect to government decisions under the influence of ethnic diversity. In this model, there is a 
tradeoff between economic growth and redistribution and the result depends on the political context. 
He finds that ethnic diversity leads to decisions reducing the growth rate in dictatorship, while ethnic 
diversity has no effect in democracy. Empirical evidence is also provided based on the data of 94 
countries over the period 1960-1990 and World Bank projects in 89 countries and shows that the 
political environment exerts influences on the effects of ethnic diversity. Easterly (2001) holds a 
similar opinion and finds that good institutions reduce the negative effects of ethnic diversity on 
economic growth by adding the interaction term of institutions and ethnic diversity to the regression 
model. Furthermore, he tests the effects of institutions on the effect of ethnic diversity on policy 
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factors and obtains results consistent with Easterly and Levine (1997), showing that good institutions 
significantly mitigate the negative effects of ethnic diversity. Furthermore, the relationship is affected 
by the level of development.  
With respect to effects of cultural diversity within a specific country, Ottaviano and Peri (2006) 
demonstrate that the productivity of US-born citizens living in metropolitan areas is positively and 
significantly affected by a rise in the share of foreign-born citizens between 1970 and 1990. Alesina et 
al. (2000) employ ethnic diversity in a Dixit-Stiglitz production structure and find that diversity can 
increase total output because of more variety of” intermediate inputs”, which can be interpreted as 
more diversity in individual skills. Diversity in skills may also increase overall productivity even 
when the cost of diversity is considered (Lazear, 1999 a, b). In addition, Ager and Brueckner (2014) 
examine the effects of immigrants to the US over the period 1870-1920 on economic growth. They 
construct measures of fractionalization and polarization and find that fractionalization has a positive 
effect on output while population polarization decreases output. Based on the data covering the 
NUTS3 regions of 12 countries in Europe, the same relationship between diversity, in terms of the 
share of foreigners, and productivity is revealed (Bellini et al., 2008). But the problem here is that they 
use the percentage of foreign-born citizens as the measure of cultural diversity, but this may not 
capture the exact cultural differences. Moreover, immigrants may have some common characteristics 
that affect productivity. Nevertheless, Sparber (2010) takes racial diversity as the measure of cultural 
diversity and a fixed-effects analysis shows that racial fractionalization of employment creates gains 
in the productivity of US cities, but the effect at the state level is ambiguous because it is only 
significant in random-effects specifications. Above all, although cultural diversity is shown to have a 
negative effect on economic development across countries, the effect is not significant when 
controlling for the influence of political institutions.  
Cultural diversity & endogeneity 
There are two possibilities that induce the endogenous problem in analyzing the relationship 
between cultural diversity and economic development. Firstly, better economic development may 
decrease cultural diversity. Secondly, people may be attracted by the better economic development 
and thus the fractionalization of the society increases. These causal effects may result in over- or 
underestimation of the effects of cultural diversity on economic development. This is a critical 
problem in exploring the effects of cultural diversity, but there are merely a few papers taking it into 
 7 
consideration. Ahlerup (2009) finds that the underestimation of negative effects exists in the empirical 
analysis based on OLS estimation. The study is conducted at the national level and four instruments 
are chosen: the duration of human settlements, the diversity of vegetation types, the number of years 
since the date of independence and the migratory distance in kilometers from Ethiopia to the centroid 
of each country. Apart from these factors that affect diversity, Ahlerup and Olsson (2007) also explore 
how local pathogen loads may affect ethnic diversity. Leigh (2006) instruments neighborhood 
diversity with regional diversity based on the assumption that population mobility is constrained 
within the region. In the Chinese city study of Xu et al. (2015), dialectal diversity is instrumented by 
the railway index in the period of the Republic of China to identify its effect on income growth. When 
exploring the influence of diversity on openness and urbanization of Chinese cities, the mountain 
index (Li et al., 2017) and migration in history (Shao et al., 2017) are used as instrumental variables. 
Michalopoulos (2012) finds that geographical variation, captured by the variation in regional land 
quality and elevation, fundamentally determines the contemporary ethnolinguistic diversity. 
Geographical factors may, however, affect economic development through other ways than cultural 
diversity. Hence, taking both geographical and historical factors into consideration, migration in 
history and geographical factors with regard to altitude and slope are used as instrumental variables 
of dialectal diversity in this study. 
The effect of Communism 
The effect of exposure to communism can be found in two strands of literature. One strand suggests 
that exposure to communism has a significant effect on the values and attitudes of citizens. Eleches 
and Tucker (2017) conduct research about how communism influences citizens’ attitudes and 
behavior and find that more exposure to communism leads to more opposition to democracy and 
capitalism, less civic participation, less support for markets and more support for social welfare 
provided by the government. Through the analysis of East Germany and West Germany, Alesina and 
Schündeln (2007) also suggest that the effect of communism on the preference of citizens for 
government intervention in the economy is positive and significant. Reasons for such effects are path 
dependence and the communist ideology that individual fortunes are largely determined by the 
social condition as the responsibility of the government. Similarly, in post-communist countries, the 
development is associated with less movement towards democracy and less market reform (Treisman, 
2014). Therefore, after exposure to communism, citizens are more supportive of collectivism than 
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individualism.  
The other strand of literature indicates that conflicts due to heterogeneity of groups are less in 
regions with longer exposure to communism. On the other hand, the benefits from diversity are also 
limited because of groups’ preference for unification. However, there are also researchers who put 
forward the idea that exposure to communism has no significant long-run effect on culture and 
development. Roland (2010) suggests that institutional evolutions, values and beliefs in current 
transition countries are more affected by the long-run historical past than the experience of 
communism. In Germany, regardless of drastic political and economic changes, regional 
entrepreneurship culture tends to have had long-lasting effects over the period 1925-2005 (Fritsch and 
Wyrwich, 2014). Therefore, from the perspective of individual preference for collectivism, the 
experience of longer exposure to communism may depress individual market and entrepreneurial 
activities and reduce the benefits of dialectal diversity or have no effect because of the lack of impact 
on cultural traits.  
However, from a different perspective, Li et al. (2014) show that provinces with longer exposure 
to the governance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the revolution war have a higher 
proportion of native cadres and suggest that local cadres contribute to higher economic growth 
because they have a better knowledge of local conditions and a better reputation among residents. 
Thus, we suppose that the coordination cost should be lower in the areas facing conflicts between 
different dialect groups when there is longer governance by the CCP. Accordingly, such experience 
should inhibit the negative effect of dialectal diversity on economic development resulting from 
interest conflicts. Hence, the longer exposure to the governance of CCP may reduce both the benefits 
and the loss of dialectal diversity at the same time and the combined influence may not be significant. 
 
III. Dialectal vs. Cultural Diversity 
While it is a convention that dialectal identity is an important component of cultural identity, there is 
no direct evidence showing that dialect is a cultural trait of people in China. Desmet et al. (2017) argue 
that cultural diversity, as measured by the probability of answering a random question of the WVS 
differently, is positively associated with good policy outcomes (less conflict, more public goods and 
higher income per capita). We use the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) to examine the relationship 
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between dialectal and cultural diversity.7 The study is conducted at both individual level and family 
level, thus providing individual-level data on answers to questions on norms, values, and preferences 
as well as observable and individual characteristics. The dialectical areas of individuals involved in 
the survey are determined according to the individual’s county. We ask whether there is a joint 
significant effect of dialects and how much variation in cultural attitudes can be explained by dialectal 









= + + + , 
where i  denotes a respondent, iQ  is the answer of the respondent to the question under 
consideration, 1,...,d D=  proxies dialect groups and diX equals 1 if respondent i  belongs to dialect 
group d  and zero otherwise. iC is a vector of control variables, including the gender dummy, age, 
the education level, ethnicity identity, the education level of the respondent’s parents and household 
income.  
The data used is the first wave of the China Family Panel Studies in 2010, which is the most 
comprehensive of all waves we have. The survey was conducted in 117 prefecture-level cities in 
which at most 3 counties were covered. Of all the questions studied, we confine our attention to 
questions identified as views to norms, values and attitudes, which leaves us with twentyfour 
questions in the end. Some questions have binary responses, some have an ordered response and the 
rest are the actual value of deposits, financial assets and total assets of the respondent’s family. Binary 
and ordered responses are readily used as dependent variables and we also compute the ratio of 
deposits in family assets and the ratio of financial assets in family assets. All dependent variables and 
their meanings are shown in Table 1. Furthermore, each respondent is matched with one dialect based 
on his county name; a total of fifty-three dialect dummies are included in the dataset. The matching 
between dialects and counties follows the Coding Scheme of the Language Atlas of China.8 To show 
whether dialects have predicting power for individual values, attitudes and behavior, we run the 
following regressions. Firstly, regressions are run in the whole sample for each question while 
 
7 The data is from China Family Panel Studies (CFPS), funded by the 985 Program of Peking University and carried out 
by the Institute of Social Science Survey of Peking University.   
8  Lavely, William; Berman, Lex, 2012, "Language Atlas of China", https://hdl.handle.net/190 2.1/19004, 
Harvard Dataverse, V1. 
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controlling provincial dummies. Secondly, regressions are done in each province for each dependent 
variable.9 All regressions are done through OLS. The p-value of joint significance test of dialects and 
the goodness of fit, 2R , are also reported. We also compute the increase in 2R  by controlling for 
dummies of dialects. 
Table 1. Variables for cultural identity 
Variables Meaning 
Status-Achievement The importance of social status in making achievements 
Wealth-Achievement The importance of wealth in making achievements 
Education-Achievement The importance of education level in making achievements 
Talent-Achievement The importance of talent in making achievements 
Effort-Achievement The importance of effort in making achievements 
Luck-Achievement The importance of luck in making achievements 
Social network-Achievement The importance of social network in making achievements 
Social network vs. Ability 
View about the statement: Social network is more important than 
personal ability. 
Wealth as achievement View about taking wealth as achievement 
Importance of money View about the importance of money 
Effort-Reward View about the statement: More effort, more reward. 
Smart-Reward View about the statement: Smarter, more reward. 
Attention-Society Attention to social problems 
Attention-Anti-corruption Attention to news about anti-corruption 
Attention-Law and regulation Attention to news about law and regulation 
Attention-Economy Attention to economic news 
Attention-Environment Attention to environmental problems 
Social sympathy Whether the respondent donated anything last year 
Fairness vs. efficiency The attitude about fairness and efficiency 
Attitude about competition 
View about the statement: Fair competition is necessary for good 
interpersonal relationship. 
Trust Willingness to trust the majority 
Ratio of financial assets The ratio of financial assets in family assets 
Ratio of deposit The ratio of deposit in family assets 
    The results of all regressions are collected in Table 2 and Table 3. In Table 2, all regressions are 
done in the whole sample and the average observations are 24,006 when dialect dummies are 
 
9 It would be more useful to examine the relationship between dialect and culture in every Chinese city. 
However, the CFPS study selects only one county for each city and there is no variance in dialects in the 
subsample at the city level. Thus, we opt for regressions at the province level. 
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controlled and 24,386 when they are not. We observe that all dialects are jointly significant at the 1 
percent level. Furthermore, by including dialect dummies, 2R rises in all regressions. For nine out of 
all the regressions, the addition of the dialect dummies increases the explanatory power of the 
estimation by more than 50 percent. In these regressions, dependent variables are Education-
Achievement, Effort-Achievement, Social network-Achievement, Social network vs. Ability, Effort-
Reward, Smart-Reward, Competition, Ratio of financial assets and Ratio of deposits. Therefore, 
dialect is an important determinant of responses to questions regarding cultural values and behavior.  
Table 2. Joint significance of dialect dummies in questions from CFPS-the whole sample 
Variables 
p-value of joint 
significance test 
2R with dialect 
dummies 
2R  without 
dialect dummies 
2R  
The ratio of 
rise in 2R  
Status-Achievement 0.000 5.8 4.5 1.3 0.289 
Wealth-Achievement 0.000 7.3 5.7 1.6 0.281 
Education-Achievement 0.000 3.6 1.7 1.9 1.118 
Talent-Achievement 0.000 8.3 6.2 2.1 0.339 
Effort-Achievement 0.000 3.6 1.6 2.0 1.250 
Luck-Achievement 0.000 6.0 4.3 1.7 0.395 
Social network-Achievement 0.000 4.3 2.6 1.7 0.654 
Social network vs. Ability 0.000 2.5 1.5 1.0 0.667 
Wealth as achievement 0.000 4.8 3.6 1.2 0.333 
Importance of money 0.000 4.9 3.5 1.4 0.400 
Effort-Reward 0.000 5.0 3.0 2.0 0.667 
Smart-Reward 0.000 4.8 2.8 2.0 0.714 
Attention-Society 0.000 8.9 7.4 1.5 0.203 
Attention-Anti-corruption 0.000 9.8 8.4 1.4 0.167 
Attention-Law and 
regulation 
0.000 7.5 6.3 1.2 0.190 
Attention-Economy 0.000 9.9 8.6 1.3 0.151 
Attention-Environment 0.000 9.9 7.8 2.1 0.269 
Social sympathy 0.000 11.6 9.1 2.5 0.275 
Fairness vs. efficiency 0.000 8.4 6.3 2.1 0.333 
Competition 0.000 2.7 1.5 1.2 0.800 
Trust 0.000 5.6 4.2 1.4 0.333 
Ratio of financial assets 0.000 4.7 3.0 1.7 0.567 
Ratio of deposit 0.000 4.3 2.4 1.9 0.792 
Notes: p-value shows the joint significance of dialect dummies of each regression. 2R  is expressed in 
percentage terms. 2R is the rise in 2R  when dialect dummies are added in the regression. The ratio of rise 
in 2R is obtained by the percentage of 2R in 2R of regressions without dummies and it reflects the power 
of dialects in explaining the variation in values compared to control variables. 
Table 3 displays the share of joint significant regressions and average 2R in each province. There 
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are, in total, 21 provinces and 23 regressions for each province. In terms of the joint significance of 
dialect dummies, more than 50 percent of 23 regressions have significant dialect dummies in 12 
provinces, which account for more than half of all provinces. In Shanxi, Henan, Guangdong and 
Gansu, the share is much higher (more than 80 percent). Except for Liaoning, Shandong and Henan, 
the average 2R of regressions is higher than 0.05 when dialect dummies are controlled for. The 
increase in 2R is also significant for most provinces. Thus, in most provinces, the explanatory power 
of dialects for variations in cultural values and attitudes and behavior persists as it does in the whole 
sample. Hence, according to regressions in the whole sample and selected provinces in the CFPS 
sample, dialects can explain cultural values and attitudes to a significant extent. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to proxy cultural diversity by dialectal diversity in China. 
Table 3. Joint significance of dialect dummies in questions from CFPS-by province 
 Number of 
regressions 
Share of regressions with 
jointly significant 
dialect dummies 
2R with  
dialect 
dummies 




The ratio of 
rise in 2R  
Hebei 23 0.696 5.748 3.548 2.200 0.620 
Shanxi 23 0.826 6.222 3.274 2.948 0.900 
Liaoning 23 0.652 4.552 3.752 0.800 0.213 
Jilin 23 0.565 10.874 9.357 1.517 0.162 
Heilongjiang 23 0.522 5.004 3.491 1.513 0.433 
Jiangsu 23 0.435 7.239 6.304 0.935 0.148 
Zhejiang 23 0.217 8.935 7.587 1.348 0.178 
Anhui 23 0.348 6.226 5.017 1.209 0.241 
Fujian 23 0.304 10.930 8.878 2.052 0.231 
Jiangxi 23 0.565 5.941 3.532 2.409 0.682 
Shandong 23 0.522 4.857 3.474 1.383 0.398 
Henan 23 0.870 4.926 3.874 1.052 0.272 
Hubei 23 0.348 7.787 5.843 1.943 0.333 
Hunan 23 0.261 5.378 5.039 0.339 0.067 
Guangdong 23 1.000 7.539 4.278 3.261 0.762 
Guangxi 23 0.391 6.726 5.057 1.670 0.330 
Sichuan 23 0.609 5.956 3.439 2.517 0.732 
Guizhou 23 0.783 10.287 7.917 2.370 0.299 
Yunnan 23 0.478 7.265 5.835 1.430 0.245 
Shaanxi 23 0.435 5.387 4.330 1.057 0.244 
Gansu 23 0.913 6.748 5.252 1.496 0.285 
Notes: 2R  is the average of all regressions in each province and expressed in percentage terms. The ratio of rise 
in 2R is obtained by the percentage of 2R in 2R of regressions without dummies and it reflects the power 
of dialects in explaining the variation in values compared to control variables. 
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IV. Data & Empirical Strategy 
Data 
The data used in this paper is from four main sources: the population census data, the Chinese 
Dialects Dictionary together with the Coding Scheme of the Language Atlas of China, the China City 
Statistical Yearbook and study reports and government documents.10 To establish the data sample, 
single-year data of prefecture-level cities is collected firstly over the period 2001-2015. 11  Since 
changes occurred in jurisdiction areas and units of prefectural cities very often in the 1990s, the panel 
data is only meaningful when focused on statistics after 1999. Even if there is a change in the 
administration area from 2001-2015, it is controlled by the respective land area. Furthermore, there is 
a limitation in accessing official population census data of counties before 2000 and much data on 
economic development of the same period is missing. In order to reduce endogeneity between 
economic development and dialectal diversity, 2001 is chosen as the starting year of the sample. To 
avoid the influence of business cycles, typically 5-year average data is analyzed in the literature. 
Although shorter period average data can extend the time dimension, 5-year average data is also 
more appropriate for Chinese economic practices, which is consistent with the 5-year plan regarding 
social and economic development in China, both at the national level and local levels. Thus, 5-year 
average data performs better. When data in some year is missing, data of the corresponding period 
is also treated as missing. 
Independent variables. We have five indices for dialectal diversity: dialectal fractionalization 
(ELF), adjusted dialectal fractionalization (GI), dialectal polarization (RQ), adjusted dialectal 
polarization (ER) and periphery heterogeneity (PH) (Desmet et al., 2009; Ginsburg and Weber, 2011). 
ELF is a Herfindahl-based metric measuring the probability that two randomly selected people come 
from different linguistic groups without considering linguistic distances (Goeren, 2014). We use this 
in the computation of dialectal fractionalization. It increases with the number of dialect groups and 
the balance of population distribution among groups. We also consider the other four indices as in 
the study of linguistic diversity by Desmet et al. (2009). The index taking dialectal distances into 
consideration based on ELF is called GI, which was proposed by Greenberg (1956). Since dialectal 
 
10 Department of urban social economic investigation, National Bureau of Statistics, China City Statistical 
Yearbook, 1996-2016, China Statistical Press. 
11 There are also cities at the county-level which are under the jurisdiction of prefecture-level cities and same 
as counties. In this study, we focus on prefecture-level cities. 
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distances are smaller than 1, GI has smaller values than ELF. RQ was proposed by Reynal-Querol 
(2002) and is determined by the population distribution between the two largest dialect groups. It is 
maximized when there are two equally sized groups and decreases with an increasing number of 
equally sized groups. Thus, fractionalization is positively associated with polarization at low levels, 
not associated with polarization at intermediate levels and negatively associated with polarization at 
high levels (Goeren, 2014; Ager and Bruekner, 2013). ER is the polarization measure adjusted by 
dialectal distances and was proposed by Esteban and Ray (1994). Thus, ER is affected most by the 
population shares of the two largest groups and the dialectal distance between them. The largest 
index, PH, was proposed by Desmet et al. (2005) and takes dialectal distances into consideration. It 
reflects the alienation between peripheral groups and the largest group. 
There are three steps to calculate dialectal diversity at the prefectural level. Firstly, since people 
in each county use one dialect, each county is matched with a dialect code referred to in the Coding 
Scheme of the Language Atlas of China. The code is designed at the dialect subgroup level, providing 
information on both low and high levels of dialect groups. For counties in which more than one 
dialect is used, only the code of the dominant dialect is taken. The matching is conducted through the 
names of counties directly and 2625 counties are matched. Counties whose names have changed are 
also considered in the matching. Furthermore, 51 counties not covered in the coding scheme are 
added in the Chinese Dialects Dictionary, whose codes are added by comparing with other counties 
with the same dialects.12  
Secondly, dialectal distances are assigned to each pair of languages used in each city according 
to the method proposed by Fearon (2003). There are 6 levels in the tree of Chinese dialects, as shown 
in Figure 1. Levels 2 to 6 are made up of phylum, stock, supergroup, group and dialectal subgroup, 
respectively. Based on the data available, the analysis is focused on the diversity of Chinese dialects 
belonging to the Sino-Tibetan phylum. These dialects are divided into 8 supergroups – a Mandarin 
supergroup and 11 non-Mandarin supergroups. The Mandarin supergroup includes 8 groups while 
the non-Mandarin supergroups include more than 40 groups. The dialectal distances are assigned to 
each pair of dialects according to the codes of dialects, (See details in Appendix B). 
 
12 Xu, Baohua; and Ichiro Miya, Chinese Dialects Dictionary (p. fl156-fl224), 1999, Zhong Hua Book Company. 
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Figure 1. Language Tree of Chinese Dialects 
Notes: As in Desmet et al. (2012), we assume there is an original language, O, of all language types that is at Level 1 of the game tree. Since Han dialects are in 
the Sino-Tibetan phylum, Sinitic stock more specifically, branches of other phyla and Tibeto-Burman are not drawn. For groups who have no subgroups, a 
dashed line is drawn and we assume that the subgroup is the same as its lower level group. From Level 4, due to limits of space, the specific name of each 
supergroup, group or cluster is not present. 
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Thirdly, the population share of each dialectal subgroup in each city is calculated given the 
population data from the population census (2000, 2010) and the China Population Statistics 
Yearbook (2006), which provide population information at the county level. 13  Then given the 
population share of dialect groups and dialectal distances, the five indices are computed according 
to the method used by Desmet et al. (2009) (see details in Appendix B). Given the limited data on 
population at the county level, only data on the dialectal diversity of 274 cities in the year 2000 and 
2010, and 275 cities in year 2005 is reserved in the sample. Since dialectal diversity does not change 
in a short period, values of dialectal diversity in the years 2000, 2005 and 2010 are assigned to 
observations over the period 2001-2005, the period 2006-2010 and the period 2011-2015, respectively, 
which is one way to reduce the potential problem of endogeneity. Table 4 shows the descriptive 
statistics of five diversity indices in years 2000, 2005 and 2010 separately. 
Table 4. Measurements of dialectal diversity 
 Year=2000 
Stats ELF GI RQ ER PH 
Obs 274 274 274 274 274 
Mean 0.2208 0.0847 0.0974 0.0144 0.0760 
Std. Dev. 0.2333 0.1050 0.0978 0.0324 0.0899 
Min 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Max 0.7802 0.4275 0.2496 0.1334 0.2988 
 Year=2005 
Stats ELF GI RQ ER PH 
Obs 275 275 275 275 275 
Mean 0.2219 0.0850 0.0979 0.0369 0.0761 
Std. Dev. 0.2339 0.1058 0.0981 0.0429 0.0901 
Min 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Max 0.7915 0.4272 0.2498 0.1497 0.2993 
 Year=2010 
Stats ELF GI RQ ER PH 
Obs 0.2219 0.0853 0.0979 0.0369 0.0766 
Mean 0.2340 0.1059 0.0981 0.0430 0.0901 
Std. Dev. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Min 0.7915 0.4272 0.2498 0.1497 0.2993 
Max 0.2219 0.0853 0.0979 0.0369 0.0766 
In the whole sample, there are 123 observations showing no dialectal diversity, accounting for 
 
13 Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census Data of China and Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census Data 
of China, China Statistics Yearbook. Department of Population and Employment statistics, National Bureau of 
Statistics, the China Population Statistics Yearbook, 2006), China Statistics Yearbook. 
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44.9% of 823 observed prefecture-level cities. Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of five diversity 
indices in years 2000, 2005 and 2010 separately. Taking 0 as the minimum value for each index, ELF 
has the highest maximum value, close to 0.8, and ER has the lowest, which is less than 0.15. 
Comparing the mean of each index in each year, all the indices have higher values in 2005 than in 
2000 and in 2010. For ELF, GI, RQ and PH, the values in 2000 are higher than in 2010, while ER has a 
higher value in 2010 than in 2000.  
The distribution of dialectal diversity among all the observed prefecture-level cities in 2000 can 
be seen in the maps in Figure 1A – Figure 1E. For all the indices, all the prefectures are divided into 
five groups: homogeneous, low diversity, middle low diversity, middle high diversity and high 
diversity. Firstly, there is no significant change in the distribution across all prefectures of all indices. 
Secondly, cities with a diversity level are not concentrated in one area. Thirdly, when diversity is 
measured by GI and ER, the proportion of cities with high diversity increases, although there are a 
few cities that become less diverse compared to the case when diversity is measured by ELF and RQ. 
Fourthly, by comparing Figure 1A and Figure 1C, cities with middle high and high ELF tend to be 
located in South China, while cities with a middle high and a high RQ are more evenly distributed. 
Moreover, cities with a middle high and a high GI, ER and PH are more likely to be located in South 
China, which can be seen in Figures 1B, 1D and 1E. Furthermore, the distributions of dialectal 
diversity across cities are similar in the other two periods, which are shown in Figures C1-C5 in 
Appendix C. 
Dependent variable. The dependent variable is income per capita proxied by the gross regional 
product per capita. We have data on the gross regional product (GRP) per capita at current year’s 
prices in the China City Statistical Yearbook (2001-2016), which is adjusted to the price level in 1995.14 
Due to missing data in the statistical yearbook, data on income per capita is only available for 801 
observations in the 5-year average dataset. We report the distribution of ELF and income of each 
period in Figures 2A- 2C. We also have more observations of average income for the period 2006-2010 
and the period 2011-2015 and find that there is no explicit relationship between the distribution of 
ELF and the distribution of income in each period. High income can be observed in cities with low 
ELF as well as in cities with high ELF and the same holds for cities with relatively low income. Hence, 
 
14 The data of GDP inflator and investment price index is obtained from the data in the China City Statistical 
Yearbook (1995-2015). 
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there is no clear pattern regarding the relationship between dialectal diversity and economic 
development. In addition, we use the logarithm value of income per capita in the estimations.  
Control variables. In the baseline regression, we have five groups of control variables. The first 
group includes the public expenditure per capita and the fixed asset investment per capita. The data 
on these two variables is mainly from the China City Statistical Yearbook (2001-2016), but the data on 
public expenditure per capita in the years 2001 and 2002 is from provincial statistical yearbooks for 
each year. Furthermore, public expenditure is adjusted at the price of the year 1995 by the GDP 
deflator and fixed asset investment is adjusted by the investment price index of the respective 
province. The logarithm values of these are put in the regression. The second group is the industry 
structure reflected by the ratio of the primary industry and the ratio of the second industry in the 
economy of prefecture-level cities. The third group reflects the financial development, including the 
ratio of loans in the GRP and the ratio of residential deposit in the GRP. The data of these two groups 
of controls is from the China City Statistical Yearbook (2001-2016). The fourth group is deals with 
labour and human capital, including the logarithm of population, employment rate, the average years 
of education per capita, the logarithm of enrolment of students in regular secondary schools and the 
number of key universities. The data on population, employment rate and enrolment of students is 
obtained from the China City Statistical Yearbook (2001-2016). The average years of education per 
capita is abstracted from the population census data in 2000 and 2010. The value in 2000 is matched 
with the periods 2001-2005 and 2006-2010 and the value in 2010 is matched with the period 2011-2015. 
To capture the capacity in promoting education development, the number of key universities in each 
city is obtained from the Ministry of Education.15 Other control variables include the logarithm of 
highway freight traffic per capita, total land area, market institutions and intermediate organizations, 
the number of high technology zones to control the effect of transportation conditions, the constraint 
of land and related resources, market environment and development in technology. The data on 
highway freight traffic and total land area is from the China City Statistical Yearbook (2001-2016), 
with highway freight traffic divided by population to get its per capita level. The index of market 
institutions and intermediate organizations is from the Marketization Indexes Report of China 
Provinces (2011, 2016). 16  The data on the number of high technology zones is gained from 
 
15 http://old.moe.gov.cn//publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/moe_648/200506/10003.html 
16 Fan, Gang, Xiaolu Wang, Hengpeng Zhu, China's marketization index: the relative process of regional 
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government policy documents and the number in each year is adjusted based on the policy of the 
year before. In addition to the control variables above, period dummies are also included to control 
for time trends. Furthermore, in order to identify the effect of dialectal diversity on economic growth, 
income per capita in lagging periods is also taken as a control variable. We also collect data on gross 
regional product per capita over the period 1996-2000. Table 5 presents the basic information of all 
the variables apart from the diversity indices. 
 
 
Figure 1A. ELF in the year 2000 
 
 
Figure 1B. GI in the year 2000  
 
marketization, 2011, Economic Science Press. Wang, Xiaolu, Gang Fan, Jingwen Yu, China's provincial 
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Figure 1C. RQ in the year 2000 
 
Figure 1D. ER in the year 2000 
 
Figure 1E. PH in the year 2000 
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Figure 2A. Distribution of dialectal diversity and average income of 2001-2005 
 
Figure 2B. Distribution of dialectal diversity and average income of 2006-2010 
 
Figure 2C. Distribution of average income of 2011-2015 
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Table 5. Variable description and sources 
VARIABLES Notation Unit  Source 
Income lny Yuan 
Calculation based on data of China City Statistical Yearbook 
(2001-2016) 
Public expenditure lnpe Yuan 
Calculation based on data of China City Statistical Yearbook 
(2001-2016) 
Fixed asset investment lnfai Yuan 
Calculation based on data of China City Statistical Yearbook 
(2001-2016) 
Ratio of primary industry  ppg % 
Calculation based on data of China City Statistical Yearbook 
(2001-2016) 
Ratio of secondary industry  spg % 
Calculation based on data of China City Statistical Yearbook 
(2001-2016) 
Ratio of loans  rlnb % 
Calculation based on data of China City Statistical Yearbook 
(2001-2016) 
Ratio of residential deposit rdnb % 
Calculation based on data of China City Statistical Yearbook 
(2001-2016) 
Population lnapop  
Calculation based on data of China City Statistical Yearbook 
(2001-2016) 
Employment rate empr % 
Calculation based on data of China City Statistical Yearbook 
(2001-2016) 
Education level  hc Year Population Census Data (2000, 2010) 
Enrolment of students lnnrss  Population Census Data (2000, 2010) 
Number of key universities n29 Integral Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic China  
Highway freight traffic lnhft Ton 
Calculation based on data of China City Statistical Yearbook 
(2001-2016) 
Total land area  lntlaar km^2 
Calculation based on data of China City Statistical Yearbook 
(2001-2016) 
Market institutions and 
organization 
mio Index Marketization Indexes Report of China Provinces (2011, 2016) 
High technology zones htdz Integral Government policy documents 
 
Table 6 provides the basic descriptive statistics for all the main variables in addition to the 
dialectal diversity indices. There is no outlier for any variables. Although there are large differences 
between the minimum values and maximum values for the ratio of loans, ratio of resident deposits 
and highway freight traffic, the standard deviation is smaller than the mean. The Pearson correlation 
coefficients between the independent variables and their significance level can be seen in Table A2. 
Firstly, there are no correlation coefficients between dialectal diversity indices and other variables 
larger than 0.8. Thus, we believe that there is no collinearity problem in the regression analysis. 
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Secondly, although high correlation appears between public expenditure and fixed asset investment 
and between the ratio of loans and the ratio of resident deposits, the regression result shows that they 
are all significant and the correlation has no potential problem. Besides, they are also controlled 
simultaneously in the literature. Hence, controlling these variables will not cause a collinearity 
problem in the regression. 
Table 6. Descriptive analysis of main variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Income 801 9.5627 0.7253 7.7098 11.7053 
Public expenditure 802 7.5018 0.8069 5.6925 10.6270 
Fixed asset investment 733 8.9635 1.0116 6.5705 11.3043 
Ratio of the primary industry  800 15.2599 9.1648 0.0440 48.5700 
Ratio of the secondary industry 800 48.6292 10.7448 16.3040 86.1200 
Ratio of loans  816 80.8407 43.9151 15.0000 302.0000 
Ratio of residential deposit 817 116.4468 51.3686 52.0000 576.0000 
Population 818 5.8345 0.6621 2.7732 7.1001 
Employment rate 818 0.9631 0.0228 0.7580 0.9930 
Education level  823 8.0574 0.9984 5.0800 11.1200 
Enrolment of students 818 2.9937 0.6881 -0.1625 4.4951 
Number of key universities 823 0.3096 1.1739 0.0000 9.0000 
Highway freight traffic 812 2.9505 0.7299 0.7326 5.5700 
Total land area  819 9.2886 0.7469 6.9694 11.2132 
Market institutions and 
organization 823 5.1957 2.9087 1.0800 14.5100 
High technology zones 823 0.2423 0.4216 0.0000 2.0000 
Note: Because of data missing for some prefecture-level cities, the number of observations for most variables is 
smaller than 823 in the sample of 5-year average data. 
 
Empirical Strategy  
The analysis starts with the estimation of the basic specification of the two-way fixed-effects model 
with panel data: 
( )0 1  var
T
it it i t itit
Outcome Diversity control iables= + + + + +       
The dependent variable is represented by the logarithm of income per capita, with the coefficients of 
the independent variables reflecting their effect on economic growth. itDiversity  
represents the 
dialectal diversity of city i in period t and regressions regarding ELF, GI, RQ, ER and PH will be run 
separately. The control variables include public expenditure, fixed asset investments, industrial 
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structure, financial development and variables of labor and human capital, as well as other variables 
shown in Table 2. These variables will be included in the regression step by step;  and  are 
included to control individual and time effects. To avoid the impact of the persistence of economic 
development in lagging periods, we add income per capita in lagging period 1 as a control variable 
in the estimation. Furthermore, to identify the effect of dialectal diversity on changes in economic 
growth over periods, we also run regressions controlling income per capita in lagging period 2. 
To solve the potential endogeneity problem between dialectal diversity and economic 
development, pooled-2SLS, FE-2SLS and IV-GMM are applied after the baseline regression. We 
instrument dialectal diversity with historical migration, the average altitude and the share of land 
area with an altitude under 500 meters. There are five large-scale migration waves within China at 
different periods in history – the Yong Jia Rebellion in the Western Jin dynasty, migration in the Sui, 
Tang and Five dynasties, migration because of the shame of Jing Kang of the Song dynasty, migration 
at the beginning and middle of the Ming dynasty and “Hu-Guang people fill Sichuan” in the Ming 
and Qing dynasties. As in Shao et al. (2017), all five migration waves are considered in constructing 
the instrumental variable of historical migration. Firstly, five dummies of each migration wave are 
constructed. If a city received immigration in the given migration wave, the corresponding dummy 
takes the value 1, and 0 if otherwise. Based on the migration map and records for all cities in the area 
where immigrants were densely populated, the dummy takes the value 1.17 If cities are in the area 
where immigrants are dispersed, only cities that accepted immigrants are specified. Secondly, we 
take the sum of these dummies.18 Of all the dummies for each migration wave and summations of 
these dummies, we find that migration at the beginning and middle of the Ming dynasty works best 
as an instrumental variable, thus choosing the dummy for this as the proxy of historical migration. 
The data of the other two instrumental variables, the average altitude and the share of land area with 
an altitude under 500 meters, is abstracted from the DEM data by ArcGIS. If the altitude is above 500 
meters, it is difficult for people historically to communicate and mobilize and languages are kept 
isolated from each other, thus resulting in higher dialectal distances. But it may also be positively 
related to dialectal diversity because regions with better geographical conditions are easier for 
 
17 Migration maps and records can be found in Ge, Jianxiong (chief editor), Shuji Cao, Songdi Wu, 1997, 
Migration history of China, Vol. 1-Vol. 6, Fujian People’s Publishing House. 
18 We sum the dummies of all migration waves, the latest four waves, the latest three waves and the latest two 
waves, respectively. 
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population mobility and the formation of a higher number of dialect groups. Since historical 
migration, the average altitude and the share of land with an altitude below 500 meters are time-
invariant, we first perform the IV regression with a pooled 2SLS model. Then we apply 2SLS and IV-
GMM regressions in the fixed-effects model, in which instrumental variables are represented by 
interaction terms of each variable and period dummies according to the method proposed by 
Acemoglu et.al (2005). Furthermore, the influence of exposure to governance by the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) during the revolutionary war is obtained by estimating the effect of the 
experience of being in an area controlled by the CCP from the 1920s to the 1940s. A dummy variable, 
revolutionary area, is constructed indicating whether a city was governed by the CCP during the 
revolutionary area.19 If more than 50% of the counties of a city have revolutionary towns accounting 
for over 59% of all towns, the variable takes a value of 1.20 Otherwise, it takes 0. All the cities in the 
sample are divided into two groups, which are shown in Figure C6 (see Appendix C). The regression 
is run through the fixed-effects model by including the interaction term between revolutionary area 
and dialectal diversity as well as control variables: 
( )
0 1 2 *Re  
                    var *Re  +
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    .21 
 
V. Results  
Baseline Results  
Taking economic growth as the outcome variable, the results of baseline estimations regressed 
on ELF, RQ and PH are shown in Table 7A to Table 7C. In each table, column (1) is the result of the 
regression when only dialectal diversity is included in the model. Column (2) is the result of the 
regression when public expenditure and fixed asset investment are added as control variables and 
column (3) is the result when the industrial structure is also controlled. Based on the estimated model 
of column (3), financial development, population and human capital, and other control variables are 
 
19 Based on the Soviet area map as well as the map of revolutionary bases, http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB 
/151935/164962/ 
20  Other dummies, indicating more than 30% and 75% of counties of each prefecture-level city, are also 
constructed and used in the regression analysis. And we select the one performing the best. 
21 Interaction terms between control variables and revolutionary area are also regressed to control the potential 
effect on the effect of control variables of the experience governed by the CCP during the revolutionary war. 
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included in estimations of columns (4), (5) and (6). Column (7) and column (8) show the regression 
results when income in lagging period 1 and income in lagging period 2, respectively, are controlled.  
In Table 7A where ELF is the independent variable, the coefficient of ELF is positive and 
significant at the level of 0.01 from column (1) to column (6) when income in lagging periods is not 
considered. In column (7) and (8) when income in lagging periods is controlled, coefficients of ELF 
are not significant, but still positive. In addition, income in lagging period 1 shows a positive effect 
on current income and the coefficients are less than 1, which is consistent with the growth theory that 
economies with a higher initial income level have slower economic growth. We also notice that 
income levels in lagging period 1 and 2 are not significant, but we find that this is the result of 
collinearity between them and other control variables. Table 7B shows the result of the estimation 
when RQ is taken as the independent variable. The coefficient is higher than the coefficient of ELF, 
but the significance level is same as that in Table 7A. In both estimations, we find that there is a large 
decrease in the coefficients of ELF and RQ in column (2) compared to those in column (1). This may 
be because dialectal diversity has a significant impact on public expenditure and fixed asset 
investment, and the indirect effect of dialectal diversity is separated from the direct effect on economic 
growth. Furthermore, the magnitude and significance of the coefficients of RQ become lower when 
income in the lagging periods is controlled, but they are still positive although they are not significant. 
In contrast, Table 7C shows that PH has no significant effect if economic development in the lagging 
periods is not controlled. The coefficients are positive and significant at the level of 0.01 and 0.05, 
however, when income in the lagging periods is controlled. 
We also run an estimation when dialectal diversity is proxied by the adjusted dialectal 
fractionalization, GI, and adjusted dialectal polarization, ER, respectively. The results are shown in 
Table A3 and Table A4 (see Appendix A). When the dialectal distances between all the groups are 
equally considered, column (2)–column (6) of Table A3 indicate that GI is not significant in explaining 
differences in economic growth. Moreover, it is significant only when income in both lagging period 
1 and 2 is included as a regressor. However, when income in lagging period 2 is considered, GI 
becomes significant at the level of 0.05. However, in Table A4, we observe that coefficients are not 
significant whether income in lagging periods is considered or not.  
Therefore, based on the baseline result, ELF and RQ have a significant and positive effect on 
economic growth. GI and PH show a significant and positive effect on economic growth when lagged 
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economic development is controlled, while ER has no significant effect in any cases. Therefore, the 
effect of GI, ER and PH on economic growth is related to dialectal distances and also the way in which 
indices are adjusted by dialectal distances. This may be because the potential benefits of the difference 
have not been exploited completely. Furthermore, the significant effect of PH on economic growth 
also suggests that the effect is determined by how indices are adjusted by dialectal distances, but the 
dialectal distance between polarized groups has no significant influence. But the result may also 
suffer from reverse causality between income and dialectal diversity. 
In the literature, the endogeneity problem is that economic development tends to reduce 
linguistic diversity because people tend to be assimilated by the mainstream culture and languages. 
But cultural evolution is a long-term process. On the other hand, economic development may 
promote population diversity by promoting population mobility. Along with economic development, 
the population of smaller dialect groups grows faster and thus the distribution of population among 
dialect groups becomes more balanced. Then, ELF and RQ increase. On the other hand, the positive 
effect on dialectal diversity may be smaller for indices adjusted by dialectal distances precisely 
because they are also determined by dialectal distances. Since it is easier for dialect groups with less 
distant dialects to benefit from economic development, their population share may grow faster than 
others. For example, small dialect groups who have less dialectal distance from the central group may 
grow faster than other groups. In this case, GI, ER and PH face a less positive effect from economic 
development and the effect might be negative if groups closer to each other in dialect become large 
enough. Therefore, when economic development has a positive effect on ELF as well as on RQ, ELF 
and RQ increase with increasing economic growth, with the result that the significant positive effect 
of ELF and RQ may be overestimated. When GI, ER and PH are affected by income per capita 
negatively, they decline along with economic growth. If the true effect of these on economic growth 
is positive, the insignificance of their effect in the baseline estimation should be the result of 
underestimation. Therefore, to verify whether the true effect of dialectal diversity is identified, IV 
analysis will be conducted as well. 
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Table 7A. Baseline results of the relationship between ELF and economic performance 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ELF 1.571*** 1.174*** 1.068*** 1.059*** 1.128*** 1.063*** 0.537 0.523 
(0.335) (0.338) (0.320) (0.322) (0.344) (0.352) (0.379) (0.406) 
Public expenditure   0.209*** 0.138** 0.138** 0.122** 0.130** 0.107 0.074 
 (0.063) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.058) (0.066) (0.083) 
Fixed asset investment  
 
0.166*** 0.083*** 0.086*** 0.082*** 0.084** 0.114*** 0.049 
 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.056) 
Ratio of primary industry  
  
-0.005* -0.005* -0.006** -0.006* -0.003 -0.007* 
  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Ratio of secondary 
industry  
  
0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Ratio of loans  
   
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001** 
 
   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ratio of residents’ deposit  
   
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 
   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population 
    
-0.074 -0.077 -0.074 -0.434*** 
 
    
(0.130) (0.164) (0.154) (0.138) 
Employment rate 
    
0.503** 0.481* 0.115 -0.148 
 
    
(0.247) (0.256) (0.247) (0.219) 
Education level  
    
0.014 0.010 -0.043 -0.009 
    
(0.041) (0.042) (0.027) (0.029) 
Number of key 
universities 
    
-0.007 -0.006 0.004 -0.175 
    
(0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.136) 
Enrolment of students 
    
-0.054 -0.054 -0.005 -0.047 
    
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.049) 
Market institutions and 
organizations 
     
0.002 0.001 0.002 
     
(0.004) (0.003) (0.008) 
Land area      0.023 -0.015 0.027 
      (0.098) (0.096) (0.073) 
High technology zones      0.001 -0.023 -0.015 
      (0.029) (0.019) (0.022) 
Highway freight traffic       -0.027 -0.030 -0.066** 
      (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) 
Income per capita in 
lagging period 1 
      
0.286*** 0.070 
      
(0.039) (0.060) 
Income per capita in 
lagging period 2 
       0.018 
       (0.067) 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 9.671*** 6.387*** 7.427*** 7.394*** 7.544*** 7.403*** 5.699*** 10.463*** 
 
(0.072) (0.473) (0.456) (0.459) (1.185) (1.202) (1.303) (1.587) 
Observations 801 729 728 723 723 712 656 412 
R-squared 0.933 0.956 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.972 0.954 
Number of cities 275 253 253 253 253 252 250 229 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7B. Baseline results of the relationship between RQ and economic performance 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RQ 3.779*** 2.530*** 2.275*** 2.253*** 2.370*** 2.274*** 1.117 0.998 
(0.758) (0.736) (0.716) (0.720) (0.788) (0.802) (0.837) (0.898) 
Public expenditure  
 
0.208*** 0.137** 0.137** 0.122** 0.129** 0.107 0.076 
 (0.063) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.058) (0.066) (0.083) 
Fixed asset investment  
 
0.166*** 0.083*** 0.086*** 0.082*** 0.084** 0.114*** 0.048 
 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.056) 
Ratio of primary industry  
  -0.005* -0.005* -0.006* -0.006* -0.003 -0.006 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Ratio of secondary industry  
  0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Ratio of loans  
   -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001**  
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ratio of residents’ deposit  
   -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population 
    -0.075 -0.078 -0.074 -0.434***  
    (0.130) (0.164) (0.154) (0.138) 
Employment rate 
    0.500** 0.480* 0.113 -0.152  
    (0.247) (0.256) (0.247) (0.222) 
Education level  
    0.014 0.009 -0.043 -0.010 
    (0.041) (0.042) (0.027) (0.029) 
Number of key universities 
    -0.007 -0.006 0.004 -0.172 
    (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.136) 
Enrolment of students 
    -0.053 -0.052 -0.004 -0.047 
    (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.050) 
Market institutions and  
organizations 
     0.002 0.001 0.002 
     (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) 
Land area 
     0.025 -0.014 0.028 
      (0.098) (0.096) (0.074) 
High technology zones      0.000 -0.024 -0.016 
      (0.029) (0.019) (0.022) 
Highway freight traffic      -0.027 -0.030 -0.067** 
      (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) 
Income per capita in  
lagging period 1 
      0.285*** 0.070 
      (0.039) (0.061) 
Income per capita in  
lagging period 2 
       0.019 
       (0.067) 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 9.650*** 6.405*** 7.443*** 7.410*** 7.568*** 7.407*** 5.710*** 10.464*** 
 
Observations 
(0.072) (0.476) (0.459) (0.462) (1.191) (1.209) (1.303) (1.587) 
801 729 728 723 723 712 656 412 
R-squared 0.934 0.956 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.972 0.954 
Number of cities 275 253 253 253 253 252 250 229 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7C. Baseline results of the relationship between PH and economic performance 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
PH 1.749 1.004 0.965 0.989 1.016 1.002 1.243*** 1.269** 
(1.083) (0.983) (0.848) (0.829) (0.832) (0.811) (0.416) (0.545) 
Public expenditure  
 
0.215*** 0.143** 0.143** 0.128** 0.134** 0.107 0.075 
 (0.065) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) (0.059) (0.066) (0.083) 
Fixed asset investment  
 
0.169*** 0.085*** 0.088*** 0.085*** 0.088*** 0.118*** 0.053 
 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.055) 
Ratio of primary industry  
  -0.005* -0.005* -0.006** -0.006* -0.003 -0.006 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Ratio of secondary industry  
  0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Ratio of loans  
   -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001**  
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ratio of residents’ deposit  
   -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population 
    -0.070 -0.073 -0.063 -0.405***  
    (0.129) (0.164) (0.153) (0.143) 
Employment rate 
    0.461* 0.438* 0.143 -0.128  
    (0.250) (0.257) (0.249) (0.210) 
Education level  
    0.003 -0.000 -0.048* -0.011 
    (0.038) (0.038) (0.026) (0.028) 
Number of key universities 
    -0.011 -0.010 0.003 -0.182 
    (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.135) 
Enrolment of students 
    -0.055 -0.053 -0.005 -0.053 
    (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.049) 
Market institutions and 
organizations 
     0.002 0.001 0.003 
     (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) 
Land area 
     0.026 -0.011 0.028 
      (0.099) (0.096) (0.075) 
High technology zones      0.001 -0.024 -0.013 
      (0.028) (0.019) (0.022) 
Highway freight traffic      -0.030 -0.032 -0.066** 
      (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) 
Income per capita in lagging 
period 1 
      0.281*** 0.064 
      (0.039) (0.061) 
Income per capita in lagging 
period 2 
       0.022 
       (0.068) 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 9.880*** 6.491*** 7.526*** 7.487*** 7.762*** 7.582*** 5.667*** 10.299*** 
 
(0.083) (0.470) (0.454) (0.457) (1.111) (1.159) (1.308) (1.613) 
Observations 801 729 728 723 723 712 656 412 
R-squared 0.932 0.956 0.963 0.963 0.964 0.964 0.972 0.954 
Number of cities 275 253 253 253 253 252 250 229 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Results of IV estimation 
All three potential instrumental variables are examined for dialectal diversity separately and the 
F-statistic of the exclusion test and the values of Prob>F in the first-stage regression are reported in 
Tables A5-A14 (see Appendix A). On the basis of pooled 2SLS regression results, we observe that 
taking historical migration or the average altitude as instruments leads to higher F-statistics in first 
stage regressions when ELF, GI, ER and PH are used as independent variables (the F-statistics of the 
instruments in the first stage are higher than 10 in most cases). When RQ is the independent variable, 
regressions with historical migration and the share of land with altitude below 500m have higher F-
statistics in the first stage. Thus, we include historical migration and one geographical factor of the 
above as instruments in IV regressions through pooled 2SLS. In regressions using FE-2SLS and IV-
GMM, we can see that all F-statistics in the first stage are smaller than 10, but the coefficients of the 
average altitude or the share of land with altitude below 500m are significant for all dialectal indices. 
In regressions using FE-2SLS and IV-GMM, we select one geographical factor with a higher F-statistic 
in the first stage as the instrument. Thus, we use the average altitude as the instrument for ELF, GI, 
RQ and PH and the share of land with altitude below 500m as instrument for ER. We estimate robust 
standard errors in all the regressions.  
The results of IV regressions on ELF, RQ and PH with selected instrumental variables are 
reported in Tables 8A-8C, with each table containing one index of diversity as the independent 
variable. Columns (1)-(3) display the results of the pooled 2SLS regression. Columns (4)-(6) display 
the results of the FE 2SLS regression and columns (7)-(8) show the results of IV-GMM regression. 
Table 8A shows that ELF has a positive and significant effect on economic growth no matter whether 
the economic development in the lagging period 1 is controlled or not. But the effect does not persist 
when income per capita in lagging period 2 is controlled. Thus, ELF has an effect on the level of 
economic growth, but no effect on the increase in growth over periods. We can see the result of 
regressions on RQ in Table 8B, which shows that RQ has a positive and robust effect on economic 
growth, but no significant effect on the change in economic growth when income in lagging period 2 
is included as a control variable. Furthermore, we can see a similar significant, positive and robust 
effect of PH on economic growth in Table 8C in all regressions. The results of the regression on GI are 
reported in Table A15, where we find no robust effect of GI on economic growth, but it may affect 
change in economic growth positively (see Appendix A). However, as the polarization index adjusted 
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by dialectal distances, ER only shows a positive effect on economic growth and an increase over 
periods in the pooled 2SLS estimation, but the effect is not robust (see Table A16 in Appendix A). 
Furthermore, in the first stage of pooled 2SLS regressions, most of the F-statistics are higher than 10, 
with others close to 10, and the coefficients of the instrumental variables are significant. In the first 
stage of FE-2SLS and IV-GMM regressions, the coefficients of instrumental variables are significant 
although the F-statistics are small. As the average altitude and the share of land with altitude below 
500m are indeed exogenous and the results of the second stage regressions through FE-2SLS are very 
different from that of the baseline regression, we think the two geographical factors are effective 
instruments which tackle the endogeneity problem efficiently. 
Table 8A. Results of IV regression on ELF  
  Pooled 2SLS  FE 2SLS   IV-GMM 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ELF 0.949*** 0.290*** 0.040 12.762** 11.878** 5.809 12.793** 11.996** 
 
(0.244) (0.101) (0.105) (5.674) (6.023) (4.026) (5.670) (5.968) 
Income in lagging  
period 1 
 0.691*** 0.787***  0.169** -0.022  0.167** 
 (0.027) (0.052)  (0.084) (0.110)  (0.083) 
Income in lagging  
period 2 
  -0.078*   -0.091   
  (0.045)   (0.100)   
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 712 656 412 704 631 366 704 631 
R-squared 0.833 0.964 0.966 0.902 0.906 0.903 0.901 0.905 
Number of cities       245 225 183 245 225 
F-statistic of the 1st stage 14.55 17.18 11.36 4.38 3.27 3.8 4.38 3.27 
Historical migration 0.081*** 0.090*** 0.10***      
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.026)      
Altitude*t1 -0.032*** -0.037*** -0.036** -0.003*** -0.003**  -0.003*** -0.003** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Altitude*t2    -0.002* -0.002 -0.004* -0.002* -0.002 
       (0.001) (0.001) -0.002 (0.001) (0.001) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Note: Additional control variables include all those in column (7) of Table 7A.  In the regression on instrumental variables, 
t1 means the period 2001-2005 and t2 means the period 2006-2010. However, in the first stage of the pooled 2SLS regression, 
instrumental variables are regressed without interacting with period dummies. 
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Table 8B. Results of IV regression on RQ  
  Pooled 2SLS  FE 2SLS   IV-GMM 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RQ 1.328*** 0.248 -0.244 27.088** 24.388** 12.784 27.187** 24.618** 
 
(0.477) (0.230) (0.290) (12.206) (12.321) (9.119) (12.179) (12.197) 
Income in lagging  
period 1 
 0.686*** 0.794***  0.168** -0.038  0.166** 
 (0.026) (0.053)  (0.084) (0.124)  (0.083) 
Income in lagging  
period 2 
  -0.093**   -0.100   
  (0.046)   (0.110)   
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 712 656 412 704 631 366 704 631 
R-squared 0.885 0.971 0.965 0.902 0.911 0.899 0.901 0.910 
Number of cities       245 225 183 245 225 
F-statistic of the 1st stage 13.51 14.48 8.83 4.01 3.32 3.37 4.01 3.32 
Historical migration 0.031*** 0.035*** 0.036***      
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)      
Share of land with  
altitude below 500m 
0.033*** -0.032*** 0.032**      
(0.010) (0.011) (0.014)      
Altitude*t1    -0.001*** -0.001***  -0.001*** -0.001*** 
    (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001) 
Altitude*t2    -0.001* -0.001 -0.002* -0.001* -0.001 
       (0.000) -0.001 (0.001) (0.000) -0.001 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Note: Additional control variables include all those in column (7) of Table 7A. In the regression on instrumental variables, 
t1 means the period 2001-2005 and t2 means the period 2006-2010. However, in the first stage of the pooled 2SLS regression, 
instrumental variables are regressed without interacting with period dummies.
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Table 8C. Results of IV regression on PH  
  Pooled 2SLS  FE 2SLS   IV-GMM 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
PH 2.218*** 0.716*** 0.170 16.738** 14.568** 9.712 16.028** 14.403** 
 
(0.505) (0.226) (0.241) (7.075) (6.806) (6.084) (7.056) (6.805) 
Income in lagging  
period 1 
 0.689*** 0.790***  0.174** -0.034  0.170** 
 (0.026) (0.053)  (0.072) (0.096)  (0.072) 
Income in lagging  
period 2 
  -0.079*   -0.021   
  (0.045)   (0.063)   
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 712 656 412 704 631 366 704 631 
R-squared 0.846 0.964 0.966 0.926 0.943 0.916 0.929 0.944 
Number of cities       245 225 183 245 225 
F-statistic of the 1st stage 21.01 23.13 14.51 4.5 4.74 5.87 4.5 4.74 
Historical migration 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.041***      
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)      
Altitude*t1 -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.001* -0.002***  -0.001* -0.002*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Altitude*t2    -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002** -0.001*** -0.002*** 
       -0.001 (0.001) (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Note: Additional control variables include all those in column (7) of Table 7A. In the regression on instrumental variables, 
t1 means the period 2001-2005 and t2 means the period 2006-2010. However, in the first stage of the pooled 2SLS regression, 
instrumental variables are regressed without interacting with period dummies. 
Through IV analysis, we find ELF, RQ and PH each have a robust and positive effect on economic 
growth across all regressions. However, GI and ER have no robust effect on economic growth. 
Compared with the significant effect of PH, we can conclude that dialectal distance between the 
central group and other groups plays a greater role than dialectal distances between other groups in 
explaining differences in economic development. In addition, compared with baseline results, the 
increase in the magnitudes of the effects of ELF and RQ on economic growth indicates that the 
positive effects of ELF and RQ in the baseline results are overestimated, while the fact that the effect 
of PH on economic growth becomes significant provides evidence that peripheral heterogeneity is 
negatively associated with economic development. Thus, economic development contributes more to 
the balance of population distribution across dialect groups, but average dialectal distances between 
the central group and other groups become smaller.     
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Furthermore, to affirm the positive effect of dialectal diversity, we introduce a random-effects 
model using the dialectal diversity in the year 2000 and single-year data of economic development 
from 2011 to 2015. Compared with the dialectal diversity and income of the same periods, the dialectal 
diversity in the lagging period is less likely to influence the economic development of the current 
period. Thus, in the following analysis, the dialectal diversity in 2000 is regressed and the indices are 
represented by ELF00, GI00, RQ00, ER00 and PH00. The results of this analysis are displayed in Table 
A17 (see Appendix A). We can observe that the coefficients of ELF00, GI00, RQ00 and PH00 are 
positive and significant. Therefore, dialectal fractionalization and polarization as well as periphery 
heterogeneity each show a robust and positive effect on income and economic growth, as shown in 
the IV analysis. The positive effect of dialectal fractionalization adjusted by dialectal distances also 
gains more supportive evidence. But we still have no evidence for the significant effect of ER. 
According to our analysis above, ELF, GI, RQ and PH each have a positive effect on local 
economic growth in China, which is different from the conclusion in the literature. In the literature, 
on the one hand, diversity should have a positive effect on the innovation capacity, which is true in 
China, as established in the research of Pan et al. (2017), which suggests that private high-tech firms 
have more innovative output in more diverse cities. On the other hand, dialectal diversity has a 
negative impact because of the difficulty in the communication between different dialect groups, 
which results in less economic interaction. Nevertheless, we suggest that this kind of negative effect 
does not exist in China.22 For one thing, the coexistence of dialects has a long history and people 
speaking different dialects can understand each other to some extent. In addition, Putonghua has 
been the official language for more than 50 years and most people are able to communicate with each 
other using Putonghua. For another thing, the same writing system is common to all Chinese dialects 
and thus speaking different dialects does not affect the ability to communicate in writing. We also 
find empirical evidence showing that larger dialectal distance has no influence on the effect of 
dialectal diversity on economic growth (see Appendix D). Furthermore, there are also studies 
showing that cultural diversity has a negative impact on the level of public spending due to 
heterogeneous preferences and interest conflicts. But this does not affect our result because we 
include both public expenditure and fixed asset investments as controls in the regression. However, 
 
22 On the impact of linguistic factor on the ease of communication and therefore bilateral trade, see Melitz and 
Toubal (2014). 
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the study of Liu et al. (2017) states that dialectal diversity is detrimental to the efficiency of resource 
allocation. We conjecture that the efficiency loss is not common across all cities and it is also affected 
by the capacity of local government and the economic environment. We will discuss this more in the 
next section. 
 
VI. The Effect of CCP Governance during the Revolutionary War  
During the period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War and the anti-Japanese national revolutionary 
war, some districts functioned as revolutionary bases controlled by the CCP. The governance of these 
districts was primarily through congress and democratic government composed of local people. In 
the process of war, government members as well as the government itself formed a close relationship 
with local residents. After the war ended, these people continued to be government members, and 
this has had the lasting effect on the contemporary government structure that the government of this 
area has a higher proportion of cadres selected from local residents. The closer relationship between 
the local government and citizens has resulted in higher government capacity in the coordination and 
efficiency of resources allocation. But the effect of the government capacity may also be affected by 
the economic environment and resource support in developing the economy. Conflicts and deficient 
allocation of resources may only appear when resources are sufficient such that the governments of 
counties have choices concerning the availability of resources.   
Since the beginning of economic reforms starting in 1978 when the unbalanced development 
strategy was first implemented, the eastern part of China has been the pioneer in economic 
development, receiving more support and resources through preferential policies in relation to 
investments, fiscal decentralization, tax, credit, investment and the introduction of new technologies 
by establishing special economic zones and economic-technological development zones.23 Facing 
relatively high amounts of resources and policy support for economic development, it is more 
difficult for dialect groups to reach agreement regarding resource allocation among local county 
 
23 There are, in total, four economic regions in mainland China, the eastern part, the central part, the north-
eastern part and the western part. The Western Development Strategy started in year 2000 and then the central 
government has been providing support to develop economy in the western part. There is also a western 
development office in the central government making related policies and decisions. Thus, the local 
government in the western part plays a smaller role in developing economy than other parts of China. Hence, 
as we want to examine the effect from different roles of local government, we focus on the eastern, central and 
north-eastern regions in China.   
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governments. Thus, the government at the prefecture level with a higher proportion of local cadres 
can allocate resources more efficiently by coordinating the conflicts between counties arising from 
different dialect groups. Hence, in the East of China, dialect diversity may have a negative effect 
because of conflicts in resource allocation, but the experience of being governed by the CCP during 
the revolutionary war should contribute to the reduction in the negative role of diversity. 
Since the economic reforms started in the 1980s, local governments in the central and 
northeastern part of China have received less motivation from the central government to promote 
economic development. Although the situation has improved since the beginning of the 21st century, 
the advantage in the East of China has persisted. For example, the ratio of special economic zones 
and high technology development zones to cities in the East is 0.869, while the ratio in the other two 
regions is 0.21. Hence, in these regions, there are only limited resources to be allocated to sectors and 
departments which have a critical need for local economic development. Thus, dialectal diversity 
may not result in conflicts in resource allocation. But the higher proportion of local cadres may play 
a negative role in the efficiency of resource allocation because of their preference for counties having 
close relations with native cadres in the upper level government. Therefore, dialectal diversity should 
have a less positive effect in cities in central and northeastern regions of China that experienced 
governance by the CCP during the revolutionary war. Taking the dummy revolutionary area as the 
proxy for governance by the CCP during the revolutionary war, our hypothesis is verified by 
empirical estimation. 
We firstly run the regression by propensity score matching on the dummy of revolutionary area 
while controlling different indices of dialectal diversity. We find that there is no difference in 
economic growth between the revolutionary area and the non-revolutionary area (see Table A18 in 
Appendix A). Therefore, the effect of dialectal diversity on economic growth will not be disturbed by 
the experience of being governed by the CCP during the revolutionary war. Furthermore, by 
introducing the interaction terms of dialectal diversity and the dummy for the experience in the fixed 
effect model, we observe that the experience of being governed by the CCP during the revolutionary 
war might contribute to the positive effect of dialect diversity (See Table A19 in Appendix A). Hence, 
there is no difference in the effect of dialectal diversity between the revolutionary area and the non-
revolutionary area.  
Tables 9A-9D report the results of regressions in the subsample of the East and other regions 
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regarding the effect on economic growth. Firstly, we observe that, in the East, the coefficients of the 
interaction term between ELF and the revolutionary area are positive and significant and have higher 
absolute values than the negative coefficients of ELF (Table 9A). In other regions, in contrast, ELF 
shows a positive and significant effect on economic growth in the non-revolutionary area. Moreover, 
coefficient of interaction terms in columns (5) is significant and negative. Therefore, consistent with 
our hypothesis, the negative role of the conflicts over resource allocation is reduced by the experience 
of being governed by the CCP during the revolutionary war in the East, but such experience in central 
and north-eastern regions leads to more negative impacts. Similarly, regarding the effect of GI (Table 
9B), we find that GI also shows a negative effect on economic growth in the revolutionary area of the 
East. Thus, the conflicts over resource allocation are common among different dialect groups and 
deeper as dialectal distance increases. Furthermore, in the East, RQ has a negative effect on income 
and economic growth in cities of the revolutionary area and a positive effect in cities that were not in 
the revolutionary area. In other regions, RQ may also induce more negative effect on economic 
growth in the revolutionary area. We also observe similar results regarding the influence of the 
experience of being governed by the CCP during the revolutionary war on the effect of PH in the East 
and other regions (Tables 9D). We additionally run regressions in which ER is included as the 
independent variable and the results are shown in Table A20. However, we observe that ER has no 
significant effect in most cases, as was the case in the results of the analysis in the sections above.  
 In brief, the experience of being governed by the CCP during the revolutionary war inhibits the 
negative impact of dialectal diversity and contributes to its positive effect in the eastern part of China. 
In central and north-eastern regions, the experience tends to promote the negative influence of 
dialectal diversity. Furthermore, the results regarding the effect of GI suggest that dialectal distances 
also play some role in determining economic development. But the difference in the significance of 
ER and PH predicts that different distance has different roles. The effect of ER is only significant in 
the East when income in lagging period 1 and 2 is controlled, while the effect of PH is significant and 
robust. Hence, dialectal distances between the central group and other dialect groups has a larger 




   39  
Table 9A. The effect of ELF: revolutionary area vs. non-revolutionary area 
VARIABLES The East   Other regions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ELF -1.961* -1.892* -2.726*** 1.262** 0.865 0.693 
 
(1.027) (0.991) (0.864) (0.637) (0.653) (0.757) 
ELF*Revolutionary area 
2.301* 2.261** 3.489*** -1.447 -2.157** -0.279 
(1.198) (1.111) (0.939) (0.896) (1.003) (0.980) 


















Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 13.922*** 8.147* 4.663 13.057** 8.635** 9.994** 
 
(4.430) (4.223) (7.231) (5.351) (4.245) (4.202) 
Observations 177 172 112 330 310 201 
R-squared 0.986 0.989 0.989 0.979 0.982 0.980 
Number of cities 60 60 59 115 115 113 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Time variant control variables shown in column (7) of Table 7A are also included in the regression. 
 
 
Table 9B. The effect of GI: revolutionary area vs. non-revolutionary area 
VARIABLES The East   Other regions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GI -0.650 -3.271* -4.611*** 1.954 1.175 1.156 
 
(0.525) (1.682) (1.544) (2.292) (1.910) (1.546) 
GI*Revolutionary area 1.744 4.252** 6.287*** -2.569 -1.671 0.350 
(1.489) (1.942) (1.568) (2.345) (2.259) (2.052) 


















Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 14.660*** 8.096* 4.577 13.030** 7.144 9.663** 
 
(4.625) (4.306) (6.985) (5.250) (4.465) (4.153) 
Observations 177 172 112 330 310 201 
R-squared 0.986 0.990 0.990 0.979 0.982 0.980 
Number of cities 60 60 59 115 115 113 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Time variant control variables shown in column (7) of Table 7A are also included in the regression. 
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Table 9C. The effect of RQ: revolutionary area vs. non-revolutionary area 
VARIABLES The East   Other regions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
RQ -4.027* -3.866* -5.826*** 2.805** 2.060 1.839 
 
(2.037) (1.961) (1.709) (1.301) (1.393) (1.788) 
RQ*Revolutionary area 4.129 4.370* 7.276*** -3.221 -3.945* -1.135 
(2.716) (2.534) (2.228) (2.010) (2.099) (2.150) 


















Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 14.242*** 8.275* 4.466 13.086** 8.155* 10.084** 
 
(4.368) (4.260) (7.298) (5.398) (4.399) (4.221) 
Observations 177 172 112 330 310 201 
R-squared 0.986 0.989 0.989 0.979 0.982 0.980 
Number of cities 60 60 59 115 115 113 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Time variant control variables shown in column (7) of Table 7A are also included in the regression. 
 
Table 9D. The effect of PH: revolutionary area vs. non-revolutionary area 
VARIABLES The East   Other regions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PH -3.431* -3.343* -5.096*** 1.871 1.176 0.929 
 
(1.721) (1.672) (1.512) (1.578) (1.364) (1.102) 
PH*Revolutionary area 4.684** 4.586** 6.775*** -1.375 -0.160 0.355 
(1.994) (1.943) (1.724) (1.950) (2.222) (1.593) 


















Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 13.782*** 8.048* 2.939 12.485** 6.362 9.768** 
 
(4.587) (4.313) (7.011) (5.354) (4.425) (4.216) 
Observations 177 172 112 330 310 201 
R-squared 0.987 0.990 0.990 0.979 0.982 0.980 
Number of cities 60 60 59 115 115 113 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Time variant control variables shown in column (7) of Table 7A are also included in the regression. 
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VII. Conclusions  
In this paper, the effect of dialectal diversity on economic performance at the prefectural level in 
China is re-examined. Firstly, five indices of dialectal diversity are analyzed to identify the effect of 
diversity resulting from a variety of languages and diversity resulting from both the variety and 
differences of languages. Of these five indices, ELF and RQ are determined only by the population 
distribution among the dialect groups. GI and ER also consider the dialectal distances of each pair of 
dialects. PH is determined by the population distribution and dialectal distance between the central 
group other groups. Secondly, dialectal diversity in the years 2000, 2005 and 2010 are calculated and 
a fixed-effects model is implemented. Thirdly, a panel sample of 5-year average data covering the 
period 2001-2015 is used in the estimation. There are 274 prefecture-level cities in the sample. To solve 
the problem of endogeneity, instrumental variable analysis is applied using the approaches pooled 
2SLS, FE-2SLS and IV-GMM. Furthermore, differences in the effect between cities that were governed 
by the CCP during the revolutionary war and those that were not are also explored.  
We find that ELF and RQ each have a significant and robust effect on economic growth. Of the 
indices considering dialectal distances, only PH has a robust and positive effect on economic growth. 
GI, however, shows a significant effect on the change in economic growth over time, whereas ER does 
not show a robust effect in any cases. Hence, the effect of GI and PH imply that dialectal distances 
also play a role in explaining variation in income, but the insignificant effect of ER indicates that 
dialectal distances between the central group and other groups, instead of that between the two 
largest groups, are more relevant. Furthermore, the significant effect of GI also suggests that dialectal 
diversity may be related to the variation in economic growth over time. In addition, the influence of 
the experience of being governed by the CCP during the revolutionary war on the effect of dialectal 
diversity is different between the East and other parts (including the central and north-eastern regions) 
of China. In the East, exposure to communist governance tends to inhibit the economic loss from 
dialectal diversity and promotes its positive effect, while it is the opposite in the Center and Northeast 
other regions. The discussion of the experience of being in the revolutionary base also shows that the 
actual effect of dialectal diversity is determined by the relative scale of benefits compared to economic 
loss caused by diversity.
On the basis of this research, there is still much potential for further study. Firstly, due to the 
limitation of data access, a longer period panel will be better for the analysis. It is necessary to do 
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further research in the future to identify the long-run effect of dialectal diversity on economic 
development, especially on the time trend of economic growth. Secondly, more potential channels 
need to be investigated. But this requires better data on efficiency in resource allocation, productivity 
and technological improvement at the prefecture level. Thirdly, conclusions of this study are limited 
to the sample we have, and it is still meaningful to conduct this research in future when more data is 
available. Above all, this study contributes to a better understanding of the effect of dialectal diversity 
on economic development in China under the same cultural and institutional environment.
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Appendix A  

















Mandarin Dongbei  
  
Jishen 1101 Mandarin Southwest Changhe 1712 
Hafu 1102 Jianghui Hongchao 1801 




Jingshi 1201 Huangxiao 1803 
Huaicheng 1202 Jin  Bingzhou Bingzhou 2100 
Chaofeng 1203 Luliang Luliang 2200 
Shike  1204 Shangdang Shangdang 2300 
Jilu  
 
Baotang 1301 Wutai Wutai 2400 
Shiji 1302 Dabao Dabao 2500 
Canghui 1303 Zhanghu Zhanghu 2600 
Jiaoliao 
 
Qingzhou 1401 Hanxin Hanxin 2700 
Denglian 1402 Zhiyan Zhiyan 2800 
Gaihuan 1403 Wu  Taihu Taihu 3100 
Zhongyuan Zhengcao 1501 Taizhou Taizhou 3200 
Cailu 1502 Oujiang Oujiang 3300 
Luoxu 1503 Wuzhou Wuzhou 3400 
Xinbeng 1504 Chuqu Chuqu 3500 
Fenhe 1505 Xuanzhou Xuanzhou 3600 
Guanzhong 1506 Jiangxi  Changjing Changjing 4100 
Qinlong 1507 Yiliu Yiliu 4200 
Longzhong 1508 Jicha Jicha 4300 
Nanjiang 1509 Fuguang Fuguang 4400 
Lanyin Jincheng 1601 Yingyi Yingyi 4500 
Yinwu 1602 Leizi Leizi 4700 
Hexi 1603 Dongsui Dongsui 4800 
Beijiang 1605 Huaiyue Huaiyue 4900 
Southwest Chengyu 1701 Hunan  Changyi Changyi 5100 
Dianxi 1702 Loushao Loushao 5200 
Qianbei 1703 Jixu Jixu 5300 
Kungui 1704 Fukienese Minnan Minnan 6100 
Guanchi 1705 Puxian Puxian 6200 
Ebei 1706 Mindong Mindong 6300 
Wutian 1707 Minbei Minbei 6400 
Cenjiang 1708 Minzhong Minzhong 6500 
Qiannan 1709 Qiongwen Qiongwen 6600 
Xiangnan 1710 Leizhou Leizhou 6700 
Guiliu 1711 Shaojiang Shaojiang 6800 
 
24  Lavely, William; Berman, Lex, 2012, "Language Atlas of China", https://hdl.handle.net/190 
2.1/19004 , Harvard Dataverse, V1 
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Guangfu Guangfu 7100 Hakka Ninglong Ninglong 8600 
Siyi Siyi 7200 Yugui Yugui 8700 
Gaoyang Gaoyang 7300 Tonggu Tonggu 8800 
Goulou Goulou 7400 Hui  Jingzhan Jingzhan 9100 
Yongxun Yongxun 7600 Jishe Jishe 9200 
Qinlian Qinlian 7700 Xiuyi Xiuyi 9300 
Hakka Yuetai Yuetai 8100 Qide Qide 9400 
Yuezhong Yuezhong 8200 Yanzhou Yanzhou 9500 
Huizhou Huizhou 8300 Pinghua Pinghua Pinghua 100 





































































      
GI -0.131** 0.888** 1 
    
RQ -0.194** 0.957** 0.813** 1 
   
ER -0.090* 0.726** 0.816** 0.642** 1 
  
PH -0.128** 0.867** 0.970** 0.853** 0.784** 1 
 
Public expenditure  0.822** -0.154** -0.126** -0.151** -0.055 -0.129** 1 
Fixed asset investment  0.895** -0.124** -0.070* -0.110** -0.013 -0.064* 0.915** 
Ratio of the primary 
industry  -0.719** 0.116** 0.053 0.099** 0.028 0.041 -0.549** 
Ratio of the secondary 
industry  0.526** -0.139** -0.083* -0.130** -0.043 -0.079* 0.322** 
Ratio of loans  -0.007 -0.024 -0.044 -0.017 -0.091** -0.039 0.053 
Ratio of residential deposit 0.093** -0.017 -0.025 -0.011 -0.074* -0.02 0.191** 
Population -0.141** 0.190** 0.153** 0.206** 0.160** 0.177** -0.223** 
Employment rate 0.214** 0.007 0.013 0.014 0.025 0.016 0.218** 
Education level  0.720** -0.146** -0.082* -0.133** -0.111** -0.068* 0.676** 
Number of key universities 0.274** -0.065* -0.066* -0.044 -0.066* -0.052 0.205** 
Enrolment of students -0.218** 0.192** 0.154** 0.210** 0.160** 0.179** -0.335** 
Market institution and 
intermediary organization 
0.385** -0.097** -0.043 -0.100** 0.045 -0.042 0.296** 
Land area  -0.280** 0.200** 0.182** 0.163** 0.183** 0.159** -0.156** 
Number of special zones 0.503** -0.117** -0.101** -0.107** -0.091** -0.095** 0.385** 
























































































































Ratio of the primary 
industry  -0.654** 1 
     
Ratio of the secondary 
industry  0.484** -0.718** 1 
    
Ratio of loans  0.012 -0.106** 0.032 1 
   
Ratio of residential deposit  0.152** -0.186** 0.080* 0.838** 1 
  
Population -0.115** 0.160** -0.230** -0.130** -0.101** 1 
 
Employment rate 0.271** -0.254** 0.197** -0.102** -0.003 0.029 1 
Education level  0.678** -0.520** 0.266** 0.115** 0.213** -0.081* 0.152** 
Number of key universities 0.239** -0.263** -0.023 0.095** 0.062* 0.234** -0.039 
Enrolment of students -0.241** 0.158** -0.210** -0.132** -0.107** 0.944** 0.054 
Market institution and 
intermediary organization 
0.349** -0.254** 0.106** -0.135** -0.074* 0.142** 0.155** 
Land area  -0.219** 0.409** -0.387** -0.054 -0.05 0.352** -0.110** 
Number of special zones 0.413** -0.432** 0.148** 0.089* 0.145** 0.209** 0.131** 


















































































































Education level 1       
Number of key universities 0.341** 1 
     
Enrolment of students -0.164** 0.206** 1 
    
Market institution and 
intermediary organization 
0.056 0.052 0.118** 1 
   
Total land area -0.208** -0.014 0.290** -0.248** 1 
  
Number of special zones 0.507** 0.437** 0.176** 0.133** -0.073* 1 
 
Highway freight traffic 0.067* -0.067* 0.133** 0.189** -0.116** -0.001 1 
Notes: ** *significant at 0.01, ** significant at 0.05, * significant at 0.1. 
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Table A3. Baseline results of the relationship between GI and economic development 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
GI 
1.572** 0.771 0.657 0.631 0.670 0.599 0.756 1.111** 
(0.754) (0.754) (0.648) (0.662) (0.702) (0.713) (0.509) (0.556) 
Public expenditure  
 
0.216*** 0.144*** 0.145*** 0.129** 0.135** 0.110* 0.076 
 (0.064) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.059) (0.066) (0.083) 
Fixed asset investment  
 
0.167*** 0.084*** 0.088*** 0.083*** 0.087*** 0.116*** 0.052 
 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.056) 
Ratio of primary industry  
  -0.005* -0.005* -0.006** -0.006* -0.003 -0.007* 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Ratio of secondary 
industry  
  0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Ratio of loans  
   -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001**  
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ratio of residents’ 
deposit  
   -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population 
    -0.076 -0.080 -0.067 -0.415***  
    (0.131) (0.166) (0.154) (0.140) 
Employment rate 
    0.448* 0.421 0.112 -0.138  
    (0.254) (0.263) (0.251) (0.214) 
Education level  
    0.004 0.000 -0.047* -0.011 
    (0.041) (0.042) (0.026) (0.028) 
Number of key 
universities 
    -0.011 -0.010 0.002 -0.181 
    (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.136) 
Enrolment of students 
    -0.055 -0.053 -0.006 -0.050 
    (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.049) 
Market institutions and 
organizations 
     0.002 0.001 0.003 
     (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) 
Land area 
     0.025 -0.015 0.028 
      (0.099) (0.096) (0.074) 
High technology zones      0.001 -0.024 -0.014 
      (0.029) (0.019) (0.022) 
Highway freight traffic      -0.029 -0.031 -0.066** 
      (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) 
Income per capita in 
lagging period 1 
      0.288*** 0.068 
      (0.039) (0.060) 
Income per capita in 
lagging period 2 
       0.021 
       (0.069) 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 9.880*** 6.506*** 7.545*** 7.511*** 7.833*** 7.664*** 5.692*** 10.331*** 
 
(0.063) (0.486) (0.468) (0.471) (1.201) (1.220) (1.327) (1.609) 
Observations 801 729 728 723 723 712 656 412 
R-squared 0.932 0.956 0.963 0.963 0.964 0.964 0.972 0.954 
Number of cities 275 253 253 253 253 252 250 229 





Table A4. Baseline results of the relationship between ER and economic development 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ER 0.070 -0.017 0.034 0.025 0.048 0.061 0.092 -0.229 
(0.209) (0.166) (0.146) (0.145) (0.146) (0.147) (0.164) (0.224) 
Public expenditure  
 
0.218*** 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.130** 0.137** 0.111* 0.084 
 (0.064) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.059) (0.067) (0.084) 
Fixed asset investment  
 
0.168*** 0.084*** 0.088*** 0.084*** 0.087*** 0.116*** 0.055 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.057) 
Ratio of primary industry  
  -0.005* -0.005* -0.006** -0.006** -0.003 -0.007 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Ratio of secondary industry  
  0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Ratio of loans  
   -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001**  
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ratio of residents’ deposit  
   -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*  
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population 
    -0.083 -0.085 -0.075 -0.439***  
    (0.130) (0.167) (0.155) (0.131) 
Employment rate 
    0.414 0.391 0.070 -0.217  
    (0.256) (0.265) (0.251) (0.223) 
Education level  
    0.001 -0.003 -0.051* -0.023  
    (0.041) (0.041) (0.026) (0.028) 
Number of key universities 
    -0.013 -0.011 0.001 -0.147  
    (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.137) 
Enrolment of students 
    -0.055 -0.054 -0.006 -0.049  
    (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.049) 
Market institutions and 
organizations 
     0.002 0.001 0.002 
     (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) 
Land area 
     0.024 -0.016 0.030 
      (0.099) (0.096) (0.074) 
High technology zones      0.000 -0.024 -0.016 
      (0.029) (0.019) (0.023) 
Highway freight traffic      -0.030 -0.032 -0.066** 
      (0.025) (0.025) (0.029) 
Income per capita in 
lagging period 1 
      0.291*** 0.076 
      (0.039) (0.059) 
Income per capita in 
lagging period 2 
       0.035 
       (0.072) 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 10.010*** 6.542*** 7.580*** 7.543*** 7.985*** 7.806*** 5.857*** 10.415*** 
 
(0.008) (0.489) (0.471) (0.474) (1.173) (1.187) (1.306) (1.567) 
Observations 801 729 728 723 723 712 656 412 
R-squared 0.932 0.956 0.963 0.963 0.964 0.964 0.972 0.954 
Number of cities 275 253 253 253 253 252 250 229 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A5. Results of IV regression on ELF-Pooled 2SLS (one instrument in each regression) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
ELF 0.464** 1.929*** 0.939* 0.079 0.745*** 0.227 -0.114 0.521* -0.060 
 (0.212) (0.602) (0.561) (0.098) (0.237) (0.254) (0.116) (0.276) (0.324) 
Income in lagging  
period 1 
   
0.683*** 0.708*** 0.688*** 0.795*** 0.761*** 0.792*** 
   
(0.025) (0.037) (0.028) (0.053) (0.073) (0.054) 
Income in lagging  
period 2 
      
-0.093** -0.030 -0.088 
      
(0.046) (0.066) (0.053) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 712 712 712 656 656 656 412 412 412 
R-squared 0.897 0.575 0.835 0.972 0.918 0.967 0.965 0.930 0.966 
F-statistic of the 1st stage 20.93 15.08 4.60 24.43 17.11 3.62 17.02 8.88 1.54 
Historical migration 0.092***   0.101***   0.108***   
 (0.020)   (0.020)   (0.026)   
Altitude  -0.042***   -0.048***   -0.047***  
  (0.011)   (0.012)   (0.016)  
Share of land with  
altitude below 500m 
  0.060**   0.057*   0.050 
    (0.020)     (0.030)     (0.040) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
Note: Additional control variables include all those in column (7) of Table A3.   
 
Table A6. Results of IV regression on GI-Pooled 2SLS (one instrument in each regression) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
GI 0.849** 2.827*** 1.544* 0.149 1.154*** 0.390 -0.217 0.818** -0.112 
 (0.375) (0.672) (0.812) (0.185) (0.312) (0.423) (0.218) (0.391) (0.602) 
Income in lagging  
period 1 
   0.681*** 0.693*** 0.684*** 0.788*** 0.791*** 0.788*** 
   (0.025) (0.029) (0.026) (0.054) (0.061) (0.053) 
Income in lagging  
period 2 
      -0.086* -0.064 -0.084* 
      (0.046) (0.051) (0.046) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 712 712 712 656 656 656 412 412 412 
R-squared 0.903 0.766 0.871 0.971 0.944 0.969 0.966 0.945 0.967 
F-statistic of the 1st stage 27.53 33.5 8.16 30.56 32.56 5.80 21.48 16.14 2.03 
Historical migration 0.050***   0.053***   0.057***   
 (0.010)   (0.010)   (0.012)   
Altitude  -0.029***   -0.031***   -0.030***  
  (0.005)   (0.005)   (0.007)  
Share of land with  
altitude below 500m 
  0.037***   0.033**   0.027 
    (0.013)     (0.014)     (0.019) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    




Table A7. Results of IV regression on RQ-Pooled 2SLS (one instrument in each regression) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
RQ 1.251** 6.002*** 1.437** 0.207 2.121*** 0.328 -0.317 1.442* -0.080 
 (0.602) (2.285) (0.705) (0.259) (0.753) (0.343) (0.325) (0.807) (0.433) 
Income in lagging  
period 1 
   0.685*** 0.736*** 0.688*** 0.795*** 0.760*** 0.790*** 
   (0.026) (0.044) (0.027) (0.054) (0.076) (0.053) 
Income in lagging  
period 2 
      -0.097** -0.014 -0.085* 
      (0.047) (0.072) (0.048) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 712 712 712 656 656 656 412 412 412 
R-squared 0.888 0.321 0.879 0.971 0.894 0.970 0.964 0.919 0.966 
F-statistic of the 1st stage 16.55 9.01 13.65 20.12 12.42 12.23 12.71 6.84 6.46 
Historical migration 0.034***   0.038***   0.039***   
 (0.008)   (0.009)   (0.011)   
Altitude  -0.014***   -0.017***   -0.017***  
  (0.005)   (0.005)   (0.006)  
Share of land with  
altitude below 500m 
  0.039***   0.039**   0.037** 
    (0.011)     (0.011)     (0.015) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
Note: Additional control variables include all those in column (7) of Table A3.   
 
Table A8. Results of IV regression on ER-Pooled 2SLS (one instrument in each regression) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
ER 2.592** 10.314*** 6.734 0.440 3.884*** 1.742 -0.602 2.545** -0.262 
 (1.187) (2.859) (4.340) (0.548) (1.131) (2.024) (0.599) (1.274) (1.414) 
Income in lagging  
period 1 
   0.681*** 0.695*** 0.686*** 0.785*** 0.806*** 0.787*** 
   (0.025) (0.031) (0.028) (0.054) (0.064) (0.055) 
Income in lagging  
period 2 
      -0.083* -0.075 -0.082* 
      (0.046) (0.051) (0.045) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 712 712 712 656 656 656 412 412 412 
R-squared 0.900 0.666 0.808 0.971 0.933 0.964 0.966 0.939 0.967 
F-statistic of the 1st stage 22.99 21.10 3.95 27.28 24.79 2.82 20.81 12.54 3.50 
Historical migration 0.016***   0.018***   0.020***   
 (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.004)   
Altitude  -0.008***   -0.009***   -0.010***  
  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.003)  
Share of land with  
altitude below 500m 
  0.008**   0.007**   0.011* 
    (0.004)     (0.004)     (0.006) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    




Table A9. Results of IV regression on PH-Pooled 2SLS (one instrument in each regression) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
PH 1.064** 3.697*** 1.342** 0.184 1.485*** 0.326 -0.270 1.010** -0.085 
 (0.482) (0.913) (0.637) (0.229) (0.418) (0.341) (0.271) (0.485) (0.458) 
Income in lagging  
period 1 
   0.682*** 0.699*** 0.684*** 0.787*** 0.794*** 0.788*** 
   (0.025) (0.031) (0.025) (0.054) (0.061) (0.053) 
Income in lagging  
period 2 
      -0.087* -0.063 -0.083* 
      (0.046) (0.050) (0.045) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 712 712 712 656 656 656 412 412 412 
R-squared 0.900 0.724 0.890 0.971 0.937 0.970 0.966 0.943 0.967 
F-statistic of the 1st stage 24.34 29.81 18.11 27.8 29.91 14.17 19.55 15.42 6.14 
Historical migration 0.040***   0.043***   0.045***   
 (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.010)   
Altitude  -0.022***   -0.024***   -0.024***  
  (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.006)  
Share of land with  
altitude below 500m 
  0.042***   0.040***   0.035** 
    (0.010)     (0.011)     (0.014) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
























Table A10. Results of IV regression on ELF: FE-2SLS &IV-GMM (one instrument in each regression) 
 FE-2SLS          IV-GMM     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
ELF 11.553* 12.762** 16.185* 10.586 11.878** 11.550* 7.327 5.809 5.315 11.177* 12.793** 16.511* 11.425 11.996** 11.791* 
 
(6.412) (5.674) (8.663) (7.003) (6.023) (6.818) (5.655) (4.026) (4.684) (6.407) (5.670) (8.570) (6.978) (5.968) (6.759) 
Income in lagging  
   
0.182** 0.169** 0.172* -0.048 -0.022 -0.013 
   
0.168* 0.167** 0.169* 
period 1 
   
(0.093) (0.084) (0.094) (0.141) (0.110) (0.114) 
   
(0.092) (0.083) (0.093) 
Income in lagging  
      
-0.122 -0.091 -0.080 
      
period 2 
      
(0.147) (0.100) (0.121) 
      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 704 706 706 629 631 631 366 366 366 704 706 706 629 631 631 
R-squared 0.766 0.901 0.858 0.639 0.906 0.910 0.870 0.903 0.912 0.760 0.900 0.854 0.639 0.905 0.907 
Number of cities 245 246 246 224 225 225 183 183 183 245 246 246 224 225 225 













































































































  (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.004)   (0.003)   (0.003) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Additional control variables include all those in column (7) of Table A3. 
 
 56 
Table A11. Results of IV regression on GI: FE-2SLS &IV-GMM (one instrument in each regression) 
 FE-2SLS          IV-GMM     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
GI 20.174 33.506 34.273 18.308** 37.672 17.434 9.716 36.092 10.841 27.916* 32.715 34.380 37.644 18.589** 17.890* 
 
(17.421) (28.424) (21.483) (8.386) (26.155) (10.849) (6.034) (60.697) (10.052) (16.653) (21.585) (28.416) (26.154) (8.382) (10.842) 
Income in lagging  
   
0.219*** 0.143 0.222*** -0.015 -0.268 -0.025 
   
0.143 0.217*** 0.216*** 
period 1 
   
(0.057) (0.137) (0.064) (0.087) (0.633) (0.117) 
   
(0.137) (0.057) (0.063) 
Income in lagging  
      
-0.042 -0.234 -0.050 
      
period 2 
      
(0.072) (0.506) (0.097) 
      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 706 706 706 631 631 631 366 366 366 706 706 706 631 631 631 
R-squared 0.893 0.765 0.755 0.927 0.775 0.931 0.916 0.320 0.905 0.826 0.774 0.754 0.775 0.926 0.929 
Number of cities 246 246 246 225 225 225 183 183 183 246 246 246 225 225 225 













































































































  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




Table A12. Results of IV regression on RQ: FE-2SLS &IV-GMM (one instrument in each regression) 
 FE-2SLS           IV-GMM     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
RQ 26.149* 27.244** 30.744* 24.249 24.388** 20.584* 16.803 12.784 9.864 25.474* 27.372** 31.876** 25.954 24.618** 21.217* 
 
(14.673) (12.278) (16.139) (17.180) (12.321) (11.455) (13.552) (9.119) (8.072) (14.667) (12.247) (15.998) (17.137) (12.197) (11.378) 
Income in lagging  
   
0.168 0.168** 0.187** -0.074 -0.038 -0.011 
   
0.155 0.166** 0.181** 
period 1 
   
(0.108) (0.084) (0.081) (0.168) (0.124) (0.108) 
   
(0.108) (0.083) (0.080) 
Income in lagging  
      
-0.140 -0.100 -0.071 
      
period 2 
      
(0.169) (0.110) (0.107) 
      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 706 706 706 631 631 631 366 366 366 706 706 706 631 631 631 
R-squared 0.906 0.901 0.882 0.912 0.911 0.929 0.855 0.899 0.923 0.910 0.900 0.875 0.903 0.910 0.927 
Number of cities 246 246 246 225 225 225 183 183 183 246 246 246 225 225 225 













































































































  (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.002)   (0.001)   (0.001) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Additional control variables include all those in column (7) of Table A3. 
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Table A13. Results of IV regression on ER: FE-2SLS &IV-GMM (one instrument in each regression) 
 FE-2SLS          IV-GMM     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
ER -5.948 -4.412 -0.512 -5.788 -0.192 -0.481 -7.923 11.339 2.244 -6.599 -2.347 0.975 -6.615 0.704 -0.030 
 
(4.338) (4.067) (1.438) (5.059) (2.234) (1.225) (10.134) (15.520) (1.765) (4.324) (3.999) (1.343) (5.032) (2.214) (1.213) 
Income in lagging  
   
0.290*** 0.291*** 0.291*** -0.024 0.225 0.108 
   
0.300*** 0.270*** 0.281*** 
period 1 
   
(0.057) (0.040) (0.041) (0.186) (0.281) (0.074) 
   
(0.057) (0.040) (0.041) 
Income in lagging  
      
0.244 -0.279 -0.032 
      
period 2 
      
(0.289) (0.425) (0.090) 
      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 706 706 706 631 631 631 366 366 366 706 706 706 631 631 631 
R-squared 0.910 0.934 0.963 0.916 0.971 0.971 0.697 0.373 0.927 0.897 0.955 0.962 0.899 0.971 0.971 
Number of cities 246 246 246 225 225 225 183 183 183 246 246 246 225 225 225 













































































































  (0.004)   (0.005)   (0.006)   (0.004)   (0.005) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Additional control variables include all those in column (7) of Table A3. 
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Table A14. Results IV regression on PH: FE-2SLS &IV-GMM (one instrument in each regression) 
 FE-2SLS          IV-GMM     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
PH 43.039 16.680** 9.097* 30.293 14.568** 7.978* -106.280 9.712 6.242 40.986 15.961** 10.421** 30.140 14.403** 8.083* 
 
(32.882) (7.060) (5.172) (21.056) (6.806) (4.461) (620.445) (6.084) (4.667) (32.589) (7.041) (5.129) (21.054) (6.805) (4.460) 
Income in lagging  
   
0.047 0.174** 0.227*** 1.316 -0.034 0.006 
   
0.038 0.170** 0.216*** 
period 1 
   
(0.191) (0.072) (0.055) (7.115) (0.096) (0.080) 
   
(0.190) (0.072) (0.055) 
Income in lagging  
      
0.570 -0.021 -0.003 
      
period 2 
      
(3.115) (0.063) (0.066) 
      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 706 706 706 631 631 631 366 366 366 706 706 706 631 631 631 
R-squared 0.696 0.927 0.954 0.835 0.943 0.964 -5.223 0.916 0.941 0.722 0.930 0.950 0.836 0.944 0.964 
Number of cities 246 246 246 225 225 225 183 183 183 246 246 246 225 225 225 













































































































  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Additional control variables include all those in column (7) of Table A3. 
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Table A15. Results of IV regression on GI (selected instruments) 
  Pooled 2sls FE 2sls   IV-GMM 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
GI 1.768*** 0.586*** 0.134 18.113* 18.034** 9.599 17.657* 18.342** 
 
(0.381) (0.175) (0.193) (9.380) (8.299) (6.012) (9.290) (8.247) 
Income in lagging  
period 1 
 0.686*** 0.789***  0.220*** -0.014  0.223*** 
 (0.026) (0.053)  (0.056) (0.086)  (0.056) 
Income in lagging  
period 2 
  -0.079*   -0.041   
  (0.044)   (0.072)   
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 712 656 412 706 631 366 706 631 
R-squared 0.857 0.965 0.966 0.907 0.929 0.917 0.910 0.927 
Number of cities       246 225 183 246 225 
F-statistic of the 1st stage 24.29 26.45 17.05 1.43 4.95 6.68 1.43 4.95 
Historical migration 
 
0.042*** 0.046*** 0.051***      
(0.009) (0.010) (0.012)      
Altitude*t1 
 
-0.024*** -0.025*** -0.024*** 0.001 -0.002*** 
 
0.001 -0.002*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Altitude*t2    0.001 -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.001 -0.001*** 
       (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Note: Additional control variables include all those in column (7) of Table A3. In the regression on 
instrumental variables, t1 means the period 2001-2005 and t2 means the period 2006-2010. However, in 
the first stage of the pooled 2SLSsls regression, instrumental variables are regressed without interacting 





















TableA16. Results of IV regression on ER (selected instruments) 
  Pooled 2sls FE 2sls   IV-GMM 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ER 5.341*** 1.671*** 0.280 -0.512 -0.481 2.244 0.975 -0.030 
 
(1.311) (0.545) (0.551) (1.438) (1.225) (1.765) (1.343) (1.213) 
Income in lagging  
period 1 
 0.686*** 0.791***  0.291*** 0.108  0.281*** 
 (0.026) (0.054)  (0.041) (0.074)  (0.041) 
Income in lagging  
period 2 
  -0.081*   -0.032   
  (0.044)   (0.090)   
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 712 656 412 706 631 366 706 631 
R-squared 0.847 0.965 0.966 0.963 0.971 0.927 0.962 0.971 
Number of cities       246 225 183 246 225 
F-statistic of the 1st stage 17.48 21.51 14.05 5.9 5.99 6.3 5.9 5.99 
Historical migration*t1 
 
0.014*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 
    
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
    
 
Altitude -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.008***      
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)      
Share of land with 
altitude below 500m *t1 








Share of land with 
altitude below 500m*t2 
   0.011** 0.012*** -0.015** 0.011** 0.012*** 
      (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Note: Additional control variables include all those in column (7) of Table A3. In the regression on 
instrumental variables, t1 means the period 2001-2005 and t2 means the period 2006-2010. However, in 
the first stage of the pooled 2SLSsls regression, instrumental variables are regressed without interacting 
with period dummies. 
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Table A17. Results of regressions using dialectal diversity in year 2000 (single-year data) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
VARIABLES ELF00 ELF00 ELF00 GI00 GI00 GI00 RQ00 RQ00 RQ00 ER00 ER00 ER00 PH00 PH00 PH00 
Dialect diversity 
in year 2000 
1.414*** 1.238*** 1.387*** 5.317*** 5.423*** 5.592*** 2.724*** 2.706*** 2.673*** -0.063 -0.023 -0.011 5.952*** 5.803*** 5.972*** 
(0.496) (0.161) (0.487) (0.593) (0.591) (0.589) (0.956) (0.953) (0.939) (0.321) (0.317) (0.315) (0.664) (0.757) (0.741) 












































Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,292 1,257 1,245 1,292 1,257 1,245 1,292 1,257 1,245 1,292 1,257 1,245 1,292 1,257 1,245 
Number of cities 263 262 262 263 262 262 263 262 262 263 262 262 263 262 262 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: In addition to control variables in Table A3, time invariant variables, such as geographical factors, including region dummy, provincial dummy and distance to central 
cities, historical variables, proxies for economic policy as well as individual effect are also considered. Control variables of Table 7 and individual effect are controlled. In the 








Table A18: The effect of the experience under CCP control by PS-match 
Panel A. Income in lagging periods is not included as the covariate 
 
Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
ELF 9.508 9.432 0.075 0.148 0.51 
GI 9.494 9.442 0.052 0.154 0.34 
RQ 9.492 9.469 0.023 0.144 0.16 
ER 9.503 9.457 0.046 0.142 0.32 
PH 9.492 9.461 0.031 0.154 0.20 
Panel B. Income in lagging period 1 is included as a covariate 
 
Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
ELF 9.556 9.469 0.087 0.152 0.58 
GI 9.558 9.472 0.086 0.138 0.62 
RQ 9.558 9.475 0.083 0.149 0.55 
ER 9.559 9.468 0.091 0.145 0.63 
PH 9.559 9.465 0.093 0.138 0.68 
Panel C. Income in lagging period 1 and 2 is included as covariates 
 
Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
ELF 9.788 9.687 0.101 0.191 0.53 
GI 9.786 9.680 0.106 0.171 0.62 
RQ 9.782 9.620 0.163 0.162 0.90 
ER 9.788 9.687 0.101 0.190 0.53 
PH 9.790 9.614 0.177 0.177 1.00 
Note: The results above are obtained by taking different indices of dialect diversity as one covariate. The 
significance of the difference between the treated group and the control group is decided by values of the 
T-statistic. Note: In addition to control variables in Table A3, time invariant variables, such as 
geographical factors, including region dummy, provincial dummy and distance to central cities, and 
historical variables as well as economic policy are also considered.  
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Table A19. The effect of dialectal diversity in Revolutionary area vs non-Revolutionary area 
Indep. variable ELF ELF ELF GI GI GI RQ RQ RQ ER ER ER PH PH PH 
Dialectal diversity 0.466 0.230 -0.270 -0.892* -0.981 -0.798 1.007 0.533 -0.548 -0.157 -0.064 -0.211 -0.131 -0.718 -0.454 
 
(0.651) (0.640) (0.543) (0.492) (1.204) (0.859) (1.364) (1.374) (1.170) (0.239) (0.253) (0.333) (1.207) (1.054) (0.883) 
Dialectal diversity* 
Revolutionary area  
0.120 0.056 1.247* 1.224 1.287 2.489** -0.215 0.007 2.589 0.527 0.527 0.340 0.936 1.724 2.523** 
(0.810) (0.817) (0.713) (0.892) (1.423) (1.105) (1.817) (1.812) (1.607) (0.348) (0.350) (0.445) (1.366) (1.269) (1.010) 
Income in lagging 
period 1 
 0.279*** 0.186***  0.279*** 0.187***  0.280*** 0.187***  0.282*** 0.205***  0.280*** 0.180*** 
 (0.053) (0.062)  (0.054) (0.063)  (0.053) (0.062)  (0.054) (0.063)  (0.054) (0.064) 
Income in lagging 
period 2 
  0.011   0.019   0.012   0.003   0.023 
  (0.067)   (0.066)   (0.067)   (0.067)   (0.064) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 11.483*** 7.852*** 8.190*** 12.088*** 8.160*** 8.211*** 11.611*** 7.823*** 7.990*** 11.975*** 7.994*** 9.540*** 11.712*** 7.736*** 7.683*** 
 
(3.410) (2.894) (2.518) (3.350) (2.906) (2.518) (3.377) (2.908) (2.510) (3.437) (3.043) (2.327) (3.407) (2.965) (2.486) 
Observations 507 482 313 507 482 313 507 482 313 507 482 313 507 482 313 
R-squared 0.977 0.980 0.971 0.977 0.980 0.972 0.977 0.980 0.971 0.977 0.980 0.971 0.977 0.980 0.972 
Number of cities 175 175 172 175 175 172 175 175 172 175 175 172 175 175 172 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Note: Time variant control variables shown in column (7) Table A3 are also included in the regression.  
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Table A20. The effect of ER: revolutionary area vs. non-revolutionary area 
VARIABLES The East  Other regions  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ER -0.937** -1.181*** -2.826*** 0.068 0.142 0.333 
 
(0.362) (0.405) (0.467) (0.243) (0.217) (0.315) 
ER* Revolutionary area 0.574 1.110** 3.259*** 0.452 0.229 -0.725* 
(0.505) (0.507) (0.593) (0.401) (0.391) (0.379) 


















controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 15.918*** 9.838** 11.409*** 13.567*** 7.432* 10.353*** 
 
(4.381) (4.320) (3.846) (4.812) (4.421) (3.775) 
Observations 177 172 112 330 310 201 
R-squared 0.986 0.989 0.991 0.979 0.982 0.980 
Number of cities 60 60 59 115 115 113 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 


























Indices of dialectal diversity 
Taking dialect  and as an example, the distance between and is defined by , 
in which is the proportion of shared branches of  and  is the maximum number of branches 
between dialects at the lowest level and languages at the highest level. The dialectal distance is 
calculated at the cluster level, with  from Level 1 to Level 6 and the value of for a pair of 
different dialects ranging from 0.4 to 0.8. The parameter decides the declining speed of distance 
as the number of shared branches increase (Fearon, 2003). The lower the value of  is, the larger 
the dialectal distance is. While Fearon (2003) takes 0.5 as the value of , Desmet et al. (2009) settle 
on a value of 0.05 and show that diversity indices perform better when  than indices 
without distances. In this paper, the values 0.05, 0.1, 0.5, 0.8 and 1 are examined, showing that indices 
with  equal to 1 or without distances perform better. Thus, in this paper, only the results of these 
diversity indices are shown in the following analysis. 
 Then, given the population share of each dialect group in each city and dialectal distances, five 
indices of dialect diversity can be calculated in the following way25: 
 
and are population share dialect group, and the largest group . and are 












25. Desmet et al., 2009, Linguistic diversity and redistribution, Journal of European Economics Association, p. 
1294-1297. 
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Appendix C  
 
Figure C1.a. ELF in 2005 
 
FigureC1.b. ELF in 2010 




















Figure C2.a. GI in 2005  
 
Figure C2.b. GI in 2010 


















Figure C3.a. RQ in 2005 
 
 
Figure C3.b. RQ in 2010 



















Figure C4.a. ER in 2005 
 
Figure C4.b. ER in 2010 



















Figure C5.a. PH in 2005 
 
Figure C5.b. PH in 2010 

































Figure C6.a. The distribution of ELF in revolutionary area vs. non-revolutionary area 
 



















Figure C6.c. The distribution of RQ in revolutionary area vs. non-revolutionary area 
 



















Figure C6.e. The distribution of PH in revolutionary area vs. non-revolutionary area 



































Appendix D: Mandarin vs. Non-Mandarin Dialects  
According to the language tree of Chinese dialects, dialects belong to either the Mandarin supergroup 
or non-Mandarin supergroup. Correspondingly, based on the category of dialects used by people, 
prefecture-level cities belong to either the Mandarin area or non-Mandarin area. It should be noted 
that there is no city where both Mandarin dialects and non-Mandarin dialects are used. Hence, a 
dummy, Mandarin, is constructed indicating whether a city belongs to the Mandarin area. The 
estimated result is obtained by the regression of the fixed-effects model introducing the interaction 
term between the Mandarin dummy and diversity indices. The reason why some dialects in China 
are called Mandarin dialects is that they have Putonghua as their foundation. Putonghua was formed 
in the 1920s and promoted in China from 1956 on. Compared with non-Mandarin dialects, Mandarin 
dialects are closer to the Chinese Putonghua and therefore people speaking Mandarin dialects have 
advantages in communicating with people in neighborhoods and master Putonghua. Thus, it is 
generally assumed that it is easier for people speaking Mandarin dialects to engage in market 
economic activities. Xu et al. (2015) propose that dialectal diversity should have a less negative effect 
in the Mandarin area. In addition, the distance between non-Mandarin dialects is larger than that 
between Mandarin dialects. According to our hypothesis that the positive role of diversity increases 
with the dialectal distance, however, the positive effect in the Mandarin area should also be smaller 
because of the smaller distance between Mandarin dialects. The opposite will happen in the non-
Mandarin area. Therefore, we are not certain about the difference in the effect of diversity between 
the Mandarin area and the non-Mandarin area. 
After introducing an interaction term between dialectal diversity indices and Mandarin in the 
baseline fixed-effects model, we obtain the estimated results shown in Table D1. The difference in the 
effect of Mandarin dialect diversity and non-Mandarin dialectal diversity is described by the 
coefficient of the interaction terms. We can observe that interaction terms based on ELF, RQ and PH 
are not significant and their effects on economic growth are the same in the Mandarin area and non-
Mandarin area. Furthermore, their main effects are consistent with the results of the baseline 
estimation. For GI, the corresponding interaction term is not significant, but the main effect on income 
is significant, which is inconsistent with the baseline analysis. We also notice that the coefficient of 
the interaction term of Mandarin and GI is negative. Although it is not significant, the effect of GI in 
the whole sample may be disturbed and it is thus not significant in the baseline estimation. In addition, 
in the estimation of the effect of ER, the main effect is significant and positive, while the coefficients 
of its interaction term with Mandarin are significant and negative with larger absolute values. Thus, 
the effects of ER on economic growth are positive in the non-Mandarin area and negative in the 
Mandarin area. This is also consistent with the insignificant result of ER in the baseline regression. 
Above all, we do not observe the larger positive role of dialectal diversity in the Mandarin area, and 
the difference in the effect of ER between the Mandarin area and the non-Mandarin area also implies 
that larger dialectal distance results in a larger positive role of diversity, which is different from the 
conclusion of Xu et al. (2015). Hence, we state that there is no significant effect of difficulty in 
communication due to dialectal diversity. 
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Table D1. The effect of Mandarin dialectal diversity and non-Mandarin dialectal diversity 
Indep. Variable ELF ELF ELF GI GI GI RQ RQ RQ ER ER ER PH PH PH 
Dialect diversity 1.455*** 0.855** 0.815** 1.126* 0.696 1.102** 3.531*** 1.985** 1.603* 0.277* 0.284* -0.181 0.780 1.338*** 1.399** 
Mandarin* 
Dialect diversity 
(0.407) (0.400) (0.408) (0.585) (0.497) (0.547) (1.057) (0.904) (0.928) (0.148) (0.145) (0.216) (0.967) (0.393) (0.551) 
-0.704 -0.584 -0.567 -1.404 0.523 0.077 -2.084 -1.481 -1.108 -0.662** -0.692* -0.186 1.430 -0.597 -0.718 
(0.630) (0.683) (0.670) (1.102) (2.055) (1.995) (1.445) (1.482) (1.477) (0.270) (0.352) (0.476) (1.825) (1.423) (1.411) 
Income in lagging  
period 1 
 0.285*** 0.069  0.288*** 0.068  0.284*** 0.068  0.293*** 0.076  0.281*** 0.064 
 (0.039) (0.060)  (0.039) (0.060)  (0.039) (0.061)  (0.039) (0.059)  (0.039) (0.061) 
Income in lagging  
period 2 
  0.019   0.021   0.020   0.034   0.024 
  (0.068)   (0.068)   (0.068)   (0.071)   (0.069) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 7.344*** 5.641*** 10.341*** 7.603*** 5.691*** 10.336*** 7.322*** 5.646*** 10.352*** 7.815*** 5.858*** 10.407*** 7.551*** 5.677*** 10.267*** 
 (1.206) (1.309) (1.594) (1.223) (1.327) (1.599) (1.219) (1.308) (1.599) (1.192) (1.314) (1.573) (1.164) (1.308) (1.619) 
Observations 712 656 412 712 656 412 712 656 412 712 656 412 712 656 412 
R-squared 0.964 0.972 0.954 0.964 0.972 0.954 0.964 0.972 0.954 0.964 0.972 0.954 0.964 0.972 0.954 
Number of cities 252 250 229 252 250 229 252 250 229 252 250 229 252 250 229 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, p<0.1.  
Note: In addition, to control variables in column (7) of Table A3 and individual effects, time invariant variables, such as geographical factors, including region dummy, provincial dummy 
and distance to central cities, and historical variables as well as economic policy are also considered. 
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